Yingkai Li

Yining Wang

Yuan Zhou

IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, January, 2024

Dynamics and Contracts for an Agent with Misspecified Beliefs.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Argyris Oikonomou

CoRR, 2024

Falsifiable Test Design in Coordination Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Boli Xu

CoRR, 2024

Multi-Modal Fusion for Enhanced Automatic Modulation Classification.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 99th IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference, 2024

Revenue Maximization for Buyers with Costly Participation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yannai A. Gonczarowski

Nicole Immorlica

Brendan Lucier

Proceedings of the 2024 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2024

Optimal Scoring for Dynamic Information Acquisition.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Jonathan Libgober

Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2024

Algorithmic Information Disclosure in Optimal Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yang Cai

Jinzhao Wu

Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2024

2023

Your College Dorm and Dormmates: Fair Resource Sharing with Externalities.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Jiarui Gan

J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2023

Managing Persuasion Robustly: The Optimality of Quota Rules.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Dirk Bergemann

Tan Gan

CoRR, 2023

Contests as Optimal Mechanisms under Signal Manipulation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Xiaoyun Qiu

CoRR, 2023

Simple Mechanisms for Non-linear Agents.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yiding Feng

Proceedings of the 2023 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2023

Bayesian Analysis of Linear Contracts.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

Budget Pacing in Repeated Auctions: Regret and Efficiency Without Convergence.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2023

Making Auctions Robust to Aftermarkets.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2023

Optimal Scoring Rules for Multi-dimensional Effort.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty Sixth Annual Conference on Learning Theory, 2023

2022

Incentivizing Participation in Clinical Trials.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Aleksandrs Slivkins

CoRR, 2022

Bayesian auctions with efficient queries.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Artif. Intell., 2022

Almost (Weighted) Proportional Allocations for Indivisible Chores✱✱.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Xiaowei Wu

Proceedings of the WWW '22: The ACM Web Conference 2022, Virtual Event, Lyon, France, April 25, 2022

Optimization of Scoring Rules.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Boulder, CO, USA, July 11, 2022

Selling Data to an Agent with Endogenous Information.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Boulder, CO, USA, July 11, 2022

Bayesian Auctions with Efficient Queries (Extended Abstract).

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022

2021

Equilibrium behaviors in repeated games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Harry Pei

J. Econ. Theory, 2021

On the Impact of Information Acquisition and Aftermarkets on Auction Efficiency.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2021

Almost Proportional Allocations for Indivisible Chores.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Xiaowei Wu

CoRR, 2021

Revenue Maximization for Buyers with Outside Options.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yannai A. Gonczarowski

Nicole Immorlica

Brendan Lucier

CoRR, 2021

Revelation gap for pricing from samples.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yiding Feng

Proceedings of the STOC '21: 53rd Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2021

Tight Regret Bounds for Infinite-armed Linear Contextual Bandits.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics, 2021

2020

Fair Resource Sharing with Externailities.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Jiarui Gan

CoRR, 2020

Multinomial Logit Bandit with Low Switching Cost.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 37th International Conference on Machine Learning, 2020

Benchmark Design and Prior-independent Optimization.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Aleck C. Johnsen

Proceedings of the 61st IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2020

Fair Resource Sharing and Dorm Assignment.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2020

2019

Efficient Approximations for the Online Dispersion Problem.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIAM J. Comput., 2019

Stochastic Linear Optimization with Adversarial Corruption.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Edmund Y. Lou

Liren Shan

CoRR, 2019

Tight Regret Bounds for Infinite-armed Linear Contextual Bandits.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yining Wang

Yuan Zhou

CoRR, 2019

Approximately Maximizing the Broker's Profit in a Two-sided Market.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing: Beyond Linear Utility.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yiding Feng

Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2019

Revenue Maximization with Imprecise Distribution.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Pinyan Lu

Haoran Ye

Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, 2019

2018

Implementation of Stochastic Quasi-Newton's Method in PyTorch.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Huidong Liu

CoRR, 2018

Dynamic Fair Division Problem with General Valuations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2018

Information Elicitation for Bayesian Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 11th International Symposium, 2018

Dynamic Fair Division Problem with General Valuations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Wenyang Li

Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018

Brief Announcement: Bayesian Auctions with Efficient Queries.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, 2018

2017

From Bayesian to Crowdsourced Bayesian Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]