Yannai A. Gonczarowski

Ori Heffetz

Guy Ishai

CoRR, 2024

Disrupting Bipartite Trading Networks: Matching for Revenue Maximization.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Luca D'Amico-Wong

Gary Qiurui Ma

David C. Parkes

CoRR, 2024

Algorithmic Collusion by Large Language Models.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Sara Fish

CoRR, 2024

Multi-District School Choice: Playing on Several Fields.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Michael Yin

Shirley Zhang

CoRR, 2024

Stable Menus of Public Goods: A Matching Problem.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Sara Fish

Sergiu Hart

CoRR, 2024

Structural Complexities of Matching Mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 56th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2024

Revenue Maximization for Buyers with Costly Participation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Nicole Immorlica

Yingkai Li

Brendan Lucier

Proceedings of the 2024 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2024

2023

Common Knowledge, Regained.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2023

Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ran Canetti

Amos Fiat

CoRR, 2023

Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism Descriptions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ori Heffetz

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

The Distortion of Binomial Voting Defies Expectation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 36: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2023, 2023

2022

The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., 2022

Unbeatable consensus.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Distributed Comput., 2022

On the Complexities of Understanding Matching Mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2022

2021

Market design job market candidate profiles 2022.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., 2021

The Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-dimensional Revenue Maximization.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

S. Matthew Weinberg

J. ACM, 2021

Revenue Maximization for Buyers with Outside Options.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Nicole Immorlica

Yingkai Li

Brendan Lucier

CoRR, 2021

2020

Bulow-Klemperer-Style Results for Welfare Maximization in Two-Sided Markets.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Kira Goldner

Proceedings of the 2020 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2020

To Infinity and Beyond: Scaling Economic Theories via Logical Compactness.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Scott Duke Kominers

Proceedings of the EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020

The Complexity of Interactively Learning a Stable Matching by Trial and Error.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ehsan Emamjomeh-Zadeh

David Kempe

Proceedings of the EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020

Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Michal Feldman

Brendan Lucier

Inbal Talgam-Cohen

Proceedings of the EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020

2019

A stable marriage requires communication.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Rafail Ostrovsky

Will Rosenbaum

Games Econ. Behav., 2019

A Compact, Logical Approach to Large-Market Analysis.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Scott Duke Kominers

CoRR, 2019

Matching for the Israeli "Mechinot" Gap-Year Programs: Handling Rich Diversity Requirements.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Lior Kovalio

CoRR, 2019

Matching for the Israeli: Handling Rich Diversity Requirements.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Lior Kovalio

Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2019

Playing on a Level Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism with a Coarse Priority Structure.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2019

2018

Aspects of Complexity and Simplicity in Economic Mechanisms (כותר נוסף בעברית: היבטים של סיבוכיות ופשטות במנגנונים כלכליים).

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

PhD thesis, 2018

Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Itai Ashlagi

J. Econ. Theory, 2018

Are Two (Samples) Really Better Than One? On the Non-Asymptotic Performance of Empirical Revenue Maximization.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yishay Mansour

Shay Moran

CoRR, 2018

Bounding the menu-size of approximately optimal auctions via optimal-transport duality.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 50th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2018

Are Two (Samples) Really Better Than One?

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yishay Mansour

Shay Moran

Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018

The Best of Both Worlds: Asymptotically Efficient Mechanisms with a Guarantee on the Expected Gains-From-Trade.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yang Cai

Mingfei Zhao

Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018

2017

Incentives and gamification.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Gustavo Fortes Tondello

XRDS, 2017

Bounds on the Menu-Size of Approximately Optimal Auctions via Optimal-Transport Duality.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2017

Efficient empirical revenue maximization in single-parameter auction environments.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 49th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2017

Gibbard-Satterthwaite Success Stories and Obvious Strategyproofness.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Sophie Bade

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

Submultiplicative Glivenko-Cantelli and Uniform Convergence of Revenues.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Noga Alon

Yishay Mansour

Shay Moran

Amir Yehudayoff

Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 30: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2017, 2017

2016

A Hydraulic Approach to Equilibria of Resource Selection Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Moshe Tennenholtz

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016

Unbeatable Set Consensus via Topological and Combinatorial Reasoning.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, 2016

2015

Dating Strategies Are Not Obvious.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Itai Ashlagi

CoRR, 2015

2014

Physical Computation of Nash Equilibrium: 'Hydraulic' Resource Selection.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Moshe Tennenholtz

CoRR, 2014

Noncooperative Market Allocation and the Formation of Downtown.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Moshe Tennenholtz

CoRR, 2014

Manipulation of stable matchings using minimal blacklists.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2014

2013

Satisfiability and Canonisation of Timely Constraints

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2013

Good, Better, Best! - Unbeatable Protocols for Consensus and Set Consensus.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2013

Sisterhood in the Gale-Shapley Matching Algorithm.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ehud Friedgut

Electron. J. Comb., 2013

Timely Common Knowledge.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 14th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK 2013), 2013

Brief announcement: pareto optimal solutions to consensus and set consensus.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, 2013

2012

Timely Coordination in a Multi-Agent System

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]