Yan-An Hwang

Ding-Cheng You

Int. J. Game Theory, 2021

2019

A correction: Ranking authors using fractional counting of citations: An axiomatic approach.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Chih-Hao Chiu

Jian-Ming Shih

J. Informetrics, 2019

Erratum to "Ranking by outdegree for directed graphs" [Discrete Math. 271 (2003) 261-270].

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ding-Cheng You

Discret. Math., 2019

2018

A correction: The <i>β</i>-ranking and the <i>β</i>-measure for directed networks: Axiomatic characterizations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Soc. Networks, 2018

Parametric axiom of associated consistency.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Oper. Res. Lett., 2018

2017

Alternative formulation and dynamic process for the efficient Banzhaf-Owen index.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Oper. Res. Lett., 2017

Union negotiations: Complement-associated games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Rahma Julia

Radhiah Ismail

Oper. Res. Lett., 2017

House exchange and residential segregation in networks.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Zhiwei Cui

Int. J. Game Theory, 2017

2016

A matrix approach to the associated consistency with respect to the equal allocation of non-separable costs.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Bo-Siang Wang

Oper. Res. Lett., 2016

A dynamic process to the core for multi-choice games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Rui-Xian Liao

Oper. Res. Lett., 2016

2014

The core configuration for fuzzy games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Intell. Fuzzy Syst., 2014

2013

A note on the core.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Glob. Optim., 2013

A note on the core: Minimal conversely consistent enlargement.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Inf. Sci., 2013

On the core: complement-reduced game and max-reduced game.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Int. J. Game Theory, 2013

2012

A characterization of the nucleolus without homogeneity in airport problems.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Chun-Hsien Yeh

Soc. Choice Welf., 2012

2011

The multi-core, balancedness and axiomatizations for multi-choice games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Int. J. Game Theory, 2011

2010

Consistency and dynamic approach of indexes.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Soc. Choice Welf., 2010

The unit-level-core for multi-choice games: the replicated core for TU games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Glob. Optim., 2010

Marginal monotonicity solution of NTU games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., 2010

2009

Equivalence theorem, consistency and axiomatizations of a multi-choice value.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Glob. Optim., 2009

An NTU value under complement reduced game.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Int. J. Game Theory, 2009

The consistent value of fuzzy games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Fuzzy Sets Syst., 2009

2008

Potential approach and characterizations of a Shapley value in multi-choice games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Math. Soc. Sci., 2008

Max-consistency, complement-consistency and the core of fuzzy games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Fuzzy Sets Syst., 2008

Potential in Multi-Choice Cooperative TU Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Asia Pac. J. Oper. Res., 2008

2007

Fuzzy games: A characterization of the core.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Fuzzy Sets Syst., 2007

2006

Two characterizations of the consistent egalitarian solution and of the core on NTU games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Math. Methods Oper. Res., 2006

2005

The core of multi-choice NTU games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Wen-Hwa Li

Math. Methods Oper. Res., 2005

A dynamic approach to the Shapley value based on associated games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Jie-Hau Li

Yaw-Hwa Hsiao

Int. J. Game Theory, 2005

2004

A Note on Closedness under Moulin Reduction.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

IGTR, 2004

2003

Closedness under reduced games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Math. Methods Oper. Res., 2003

The Harsanyi-Shapley solution and independence of irrelevant expansions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Int. J. Game Theory, 2003

2002

Closedness under Hart-Mas Colell reduction.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Int. J. Game Theory, 2002

2001

Axiomatizations of the core on the universal domain and other natural domains.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Peter Sudhölter

Int. J. Game Theory, 2001

Some results related to the Harsanyi-Shapley solution.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Int. J. Game Theory, 2001

Two Characterisations of the Lexicographic egalitarian Solution.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

IGTR, 2001

1999

A characterization of the leximin solution of the bargaining problem.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]