Vincent Conitzer

Proceedings of the Thirty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2023

2022

Pacing Equilibrium in First Price Auction Markets.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Nicolás E. Stier Moses

Eric Sodomka

Christopher A. Wilkens

Manag. Sci., December, 2022

Puzzle: communicating to plan noam nisan's 60th birthday workshop.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., July, 2022

Multiplicative Pacing Equilibria in Auction Markets.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Christian Kroer

Eric Sodomka

Nicolás E. Stier Moses

Oper. Res., 2022

Mechanism Design for Correlated Valuations: Efficient Methods for Revenue Maximization.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Oper. Res., 2022

Similarity-based Cooperation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2022

Tradeoffs in Preventing Manipulation in Paper Bidding for Reviewer Assignment.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2022

Safe Pareto improvements for delegated game playing.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2022

Efficient Algorithms for Planning with Participation Constraints.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Boulder, CO, USA, July 11, 2022

For Learning in Symmetric Teams, Local Optima are Global Nash Equilibria.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the International Conference on Machine Learning, 2022

Near-Optimal Reviewer Splitting in Two-Phase Paper Reviewing and Conference Experiment Design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2022

Planning with Participation Constraints.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022

Learning Influence Adoption in Heterogeneous Networks.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Debmalya Panigrahi

Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022

2021

The Revelation Principle for Mechanism Design with Signaling Costs.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Andrew Kephart

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2021

Welfare-Preserving ε-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 17th International Conference, 2021

Automated Dynamic Mechanism Design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 34: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2021, 2021

Automated Mechanism Design for Strategic Classification: Abstract for KDD'21 Keynote Talk.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the KDD '21: The 27th ACM SIGKDD Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, 2021

Ethical Implementation of Artificial Intelligence to Select Embryos in In Vitro Fertilization.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Michael Anis Mihdi Afnan

Proceedings of the AIES '21: AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, 2021

Incentive-Aware PAC Learning.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

Classification with Few Tests through Self-Selection.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

Automated Mechanism Design for Classification with Partial Verification.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

Indecision Modeling.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Duncan C. McElfresh

Lok Chan

Kenzie Doyle

John P. Dickerson

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

Classification with Strategically Withheld Data.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Anilesh K. Krishnaswamy

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

2020

Crying about a strategic wolf: A theory of crime and warning.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Aaron M. Kolb

J. Econ. Theory, 2020

Adapting a kidney exchange algorithm to align with human values.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Rachel Freedman

John P. Dickerson

Artif. Intell., 2020

Decision Scoring Rules.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 16th International Conference, 2020

Minimum-Regret Contracts for Principal-Expert Problems.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 16th International Conference, 2020

Bayesian Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Persistent State, with Application to Security Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Shaddin Dughmi

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 16th International Conference, 2020

Combinatorial Ski Rental and Online Bipartite Matching.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020

Mitigating Manipulation in Peer Review via Randomized Reviewer Assignments.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 33: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2020, 2020

Extracting Money from Causal Decision Theorists.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Workshop on Artificial Intelligence Safety 2020 co-located with the 29th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 17th Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-PRICAI 2020), 2020

Learning the Valuations of a k-demand Agent.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 37th International Conference on Machine Learning, 2020

Learning Opinions in Social Networks.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Debmalya Panigrahi

Proceedings of the 37th International Conference on Machine Learning, 2020

Artificial Artificial Intelligence: Measuring Influence of AI 'Assessments' on Moral Decision-Making.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the AIES '20: AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, 2020

2019

Puzzle: the AI circus: (puzzle in honor of Tuomas Sandholm's 50th birthday).

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., 2019

The Exact Computational Complexity of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Math. Oper. Res., 2019

Distinguishing Distributions When Samples Are Strategically Transformed.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 32: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2019, 2019

When Samples Are Strategically Selected.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 36th International Conference on Machine Learning, 2019

A Better Algorithm for Societal Tradeoffs.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

A PAC Framework for Aggregating Agents' Judgments.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

Group Fairness for the Allocation of Indivisible Goods.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Nisarg Shah

Jennifer Wortman Vaughan

Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

Designing Preferences, Beliefs, and Identities for Artificial Intelligence.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

2018

Dynamic Proportional Sharing: A Game-Theoretic Approach.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proc. ACM Meas. Anal. Comput. Syst., 2018

Can Artificial Intelligence Do Everything That We Can?

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2018

Technical perspective: Designing algorithms and the fairness criteria they should satisfy.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Commun. ACM, 2018

Coalition structure generation in cooperative games with compact representations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2018

Complexity of Scheduling Charging in the Smart Grid.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018

When Do People Want AI to Make Decisions?

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Max F. Kramer

Proceedings of the 2018 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society, 2018

Disarmament Games With Resource.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018

2017

Farewell Editorial: Looking Back on Our Terms Editing ACM TEAC and into the Future.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

R. Preston McAfee

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2017

Justified representation in approval-based committee voting.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Soc. Choice Welf., 2017

Game-Theoretic Question Selection for Tests.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2017

Complexity of Scheduling Charging in the Smart Grid.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Mathijs de Weerdt

CoRR, 2017

Fair Public Decision Making.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Nisarg Shah

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

Fair and Efficient Social Choice in Dynamic Settings.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Seyed Majid Zahedi

Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017

Mechanism Design with Unknown Correlated Distributions: Can We Learn Optimal Mechanisms?

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Peter Stone

Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, 2017

Disarmament Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-First AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017

Moral Decision Making Frameworks for Artificial Intelligence.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Max Kramer

Proceedings of the Workshops of the The Thirty-First AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017

Automated Design of Robust Mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Peter Stone

Proceedings of the Thirty-First AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017

2016

Barriers to Manipulation in Voting.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Toby Walsh

Proceedings of the Handbook of Computational Social Choice, 2016

Introduction to Computational Social Choice.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Handbook of Computational Social Choice, 2016

Introduction to the Special Issue on EC'14.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

David A. Easley

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2016

On Stackelberg mixed strategies.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Synth., 2016

Nash Welfare and Round Robin Share.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2016

Philosophy in the Face of Artificial Intelligence.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2016

Computing Equilibria with Partial Commitment.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 12th International Conference, 2016

The Revelation Principle for Mechanism Design with Reporting Costs.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Andrew Kephart

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016

False-Name-Proof Recommendations in Social Networks.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, 2016

Timeability of Extensive-Form Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Sune K. Jakobsen

Troels Bjerre Sørensen

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science, 2016

Role Assignment for Game-Theoretic Cooperation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Catherine Moon

Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016

Catcher-Evader Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016

ATUCAPTS: Automated Tests that a User Cannot Pass Twice Simultaneously.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Garrett Andersen

Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016

Signaling in Bayesian Stackelberg Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems, 2016

Role Assignment for Game-Theoretic Cooperation: (Extended Abstract).

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Catherine Moon

Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems, 2016

Rules for Choosing Societal Tradeoffs.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirtieth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016

Computing Possible and Necessary Equilibrium Actions (and Bipartisan Set Winners).

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirtieth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016

Maximizing Revenue with Limited Correlation: The Cost of Ex-Post Incentive Compatibility.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Giuseppe Lopomo

Proceedings of the Thirtieth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016

2015

Can rational choice guide us to correct de se beliefs?

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Synth., 2015

A Dutch book against sleeping beauties who are evidential decision theorists.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Synth., 2015

Maximal Cooperation in Repeated Games on Social Networks.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Catherine Moon

Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015

Complexity of Mechanism Design with Signaling Costs.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Andrew Kephart

Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2015

General Tiebreaking Schemes for Computational Social Choice.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2015

Crowdsourcing Societal Tradeoffs.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2015

Cooperative Game Solution Concepts that Maximize Stability under Noise.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015

Strategic Voting and Strategic Candidacy.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015

Assessing the Robustness of Cremer-McLean with Automated Mechanism Design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Giuseppe Lopomo

Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015

2014

Notes from the EC'14 program chairs.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

David A. Easley

SIGecom Exch., 2014

False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Mathijs Michiel de Weerdt

Int. J. Game Theory, 2014

Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Paul Harrenstein

Games Econ. Behav., 2014

Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Artif. Intell., 2014

On the value of commitment.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2014

The Maximum Likelihood Approach to Voting on Social Networks.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, 2014

Complexity of stability-based solution concepts in multi-issue and MC-net cooperative games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the International conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 2014

Solving Zero-Sum Security Games in Discretized Spatio-Temporal Domains.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2014

Beat the Cheater: Computing Game-Theoretic Strategies for When to Kick a Gambler out of a Casino.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Troels Bjerre Sørensen

Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2014

On the Axiomatic Characterization of Runoff Voting Rules.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2014

Mechanism Design for Scheduling with Uncertain Execution Time.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Angelina Vidali

Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2014

2013

The ACM transactions on economics and computation: An introduction.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

R. Preston McAfee

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2013

Undominated Groves Mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2013

False-name-proof matching.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Taiki Todo

Proceedings of the International conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 2013

Optimal internet auctions with costly communication.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the International conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 2013

Security scheduling for real-world networks.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Manish Jain

Milind Tambe

Proceedings of the International conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 2013

Solving Security Games on Graphs via Marginal Probabilities.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2013

Fast Equilibrium Computation for Infinitely Repeated Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Garrett Andersen

Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2013

2012

Computing Stackelberg strategies in stochastic games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Charles L. Isbell Jr.

SIGecom Exch., 2012

Should social network structure be taken into account in elections?

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Math. Soc. Sci., 2012

Hide and Seek: Costly Consumer Privacy in a Market with Repeat Purchases.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Curtis R. Taylor

Mark. Sci., 2012

Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Comput. Syst. Sci., 2012

Choosing fair lotteries to defeat the competition.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Int. J. Game Theory, 2012

Computing a Profit-Maximizing Sequence of Offers to Agents in a Social Network.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Sayan Bhattacharya

Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics - 8th International Workshop, 2012

Paradoxes of Multiple Elections: An Approximation Approach.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings of the Thirteenth International Conference, 2012

Approximating Common Voting Rules by Sequential Voting in Multi-Issue Domains.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, 2012

An Undergraduate Course in the Intersection of Computer Science and Economics.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Third Symposium on Education Advances in Artificial Intelligence, 2012

Evaluating Resistance to False-Name Manipulations in Elections.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Bo Waggoner

Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2012

Computing Optimal Strategies to Commit to in Stochastic Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Charles L. Isbell Jr.

Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2012

Computing Game-Theoretic Solutions and Applications to Security.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2012

2011

Discussion of "A conditional game for comparing approximations".

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Fourteenth International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics, 2011

Determining Possible and Necessary Winners Given Partial Orders.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2011

Stackelberg vs. Nash in Security Games: An Extended Investigation of Interchangeability, Equivalence, and Uniqueness.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Zhengyu Yin

Christopher Kiekintveld

Milind Tambe

J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2011

Expressive markets for donating to charities.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Artif. Intell., 2011

Aggregating value ranges: preference elicitation and truthfulness.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Joseph Farfel

Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2011

An NTU Cooperative Game Theoretic View of Manipulating Elections.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Michael Zuckerman

Piotr Faliszewski

Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics - 7th International Workshop, 2011

Budget-Balanced and Nearly Efficient Randomized Mechanisms: Public Goods and beyond.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics - 7th International Workshop, 2011

Approximation Algorithm for Security Games with Costly Resources.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Sayan Bhattacharya

Kamesh Munagala

Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics - 7th International Workshop, 2011

Strategic sequential voting in multi-issue domains and multiple-election paradoxes.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Proceedings 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2011), 2011

A Maximum Likelihood Approach towards Aggregating Partial Orders.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the IJCAI 2011, 2011

Security Games with Multiple Attacker Resources.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the IJCAI 2011, 2011

Hypercubewise Preference Aggregation in Multi-Issue Domains.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the IJCAI 2011, 2011

Solving Stackelberg games with uncertain observability.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2011), 2011

A double oracle algorithm for zero-sum security games on graphs.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2011), 2011

Dominating Manipulations in Voting with Partial Information.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Toby Walsh

Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2011

Commitment to Correlated Strategies.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2011

Metareasoning as a Formal Computational Problem.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Metareasoning - Thinking about Thinking., 2011

2010

Editor's puzzle: borrowing as cheaply as possible.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., 2010

Making decisions based on the preferences of multiple agents.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Commun. ACM, 2010

Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ann. Math. Artif. Intell., 2010

Using Mechanism Design to Prevent False-Name Manipulations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Makoto Yokoo

AI Mag., 2010

Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Artif. Intell., 2010

Strategy-Proof Voting Rules over Multi-issue Domains with Restricted Preferences.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics - 6th International Workshop, 2010

False-Name-Proofness in Social Networks.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics - 6th International Workshop, 2010

Incentive Compatible Budget Elicitation in Multi-unit Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2010

A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ariel D. Procaccia

Proceedings of the Proceedings 11th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2010), 2010

Computing optimal strategies to commit to in extensive-form games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Proceedings 11th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2010), 2010

10101 Executive Summary - Computational Foundations of Social Choice.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Felix Brandt

Lane A. Hemaspaandra

Jean-François Laslier

William S. Zwicker

Proceedings of the Computational Foundations of Social Choice, 07.03. - 12.03.2010, 2010

10101 Abstracts Collection - Computational Foundations of Social Choice.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Felix Brandt

Lane A. Hemaspaandra

Jean-François Laslier

William S. Zwicker

Proceedings of the Computational Foundations of Social Choice, 07.03. - 12.03.2010, 2010

Stackelberg vs. Nash in security games: interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Zhengyu Yin

Christopher Kiekintveld

Milind Tambe

Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2010), 2010

Aggregating preferences in multi-issue domains by using maximum likelihood estimators.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2010), 2010

Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2010), 2010

False-name-proofness with bid withdrawal.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2010), 2010

Strategy-proof allocation of multiple items between two agents without payments or priors.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2010), 2010

Stackelberg Voting Games: Computational Aspects and Paradoxes.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2010

Compilation Complexity of Common Voting Rules.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2010

Complexity of Computing Optimal Stackelberg Strategies in Security Resource Allocation Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2010

Computationally Feasible Automated Mechanism Design: General Approach and Case Studies.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2010

2009

Editor's puzzle: a dutch dutch auction clock auction.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., 2009

Editor's introduction.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., 2009

Editor's puzzle: identifying the champion.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., 2009

Eliciting Single-Peaked Preferences Using Comparison Queries.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2009

Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., 2009

AAAI 2008 Workshop Reports.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

AI Mag., 2009

Prediction Mechanisms That Do Not Incentivize Undesirable Actions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Peng Shi

Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics, 5th International Workshop, 2009

Competitive Repeated Allocation without Payments.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Daniel M. Reeves

Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics, 5th International Workshop, 2009

Prediction Markets, Mechanism Design, and Cooperative Game Theory.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the UAI 2009, 2009

A qualitative vickrey auction.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Paul Harrenstein

Mathijs de Weerdt

Proceedings of the Proceedings 10th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2009), 2009

Learning and Approximating the Optimal Strategy to Commit To.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Kamesh Munagala

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory, Second International Symposium, 2009

Complexity of Unweighted Coalitional Manipulation under Some Common Voting Rules.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

Proceedings of the IJCAI 2009, 2009

Finite Local Consistency Characterizes Generalized Scoring Rules.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the IJCAI 2009, 2009

Multi-Step Multi-Sensor Hider-Seeker Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Erik Halvorson

Proceedings of the IJCAI 2009, 2009

Preference Functions that Score Rankings and Maximum Likelihood Estimation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Matthew Rognlie

Proceedings of the IJCAI 2009, 2009

How Hard Is It to Control Sequential Elections via the Agenda?

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the IJCAI 2009, 2009

Coalition Structure Generation Utilizing Compact Characteristic Function Representations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming, 2009

A multiagent Turing test based on a prediction market.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Joseph Farfel

Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2009), 2009

Turing Trade: A Hybrid of a Turing Test and a Prediction Market.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Joseph Farfel

Proceedings of the Auctions, 2009

Approximation guarantees for fictitious play.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 47th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, 2009

2008

Editor's puzzle: product adoption in a social network.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., 2008

Editor's puzzle: strategically choosing products to release.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., 2008

New complexity results about Nash equilibria.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., 2008

An "Ethical" Game-Theoretic Solution Concept for Two-Player Perfect-Information Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Kamal Jain

Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics, 4th International Workshop, 2008

Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics, 4th International Workshop, 2008

Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Proceedings 9th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2008), 2008

A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Proceedings 9th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2008), 2008

Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Proceedings 9th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2008), 2008

Strategic betting for competitive agents.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2008), 2008

Anonymity-proof Shapley value: extending shapley value for coalitional games in open environments.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2008), 2008

Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2008), 2008

Using a Memory Test to Limit a User to One Account.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce and Trading Agent Design and Analysis, 2008

Voting on Multiattribute Domains with Cyclic Preferential Dependencies.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2008

Determining Possible and Necessary Winners under Common Voting Rules Given Partial Orders.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2008

Optimal False-Name-Proof Voting Rules with Costly Voting.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2008

2007

Editor's puzzle: combinatorial auction winner determination.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., 2007

AWESOME: A general multiagent learning algorithm that converges in self-play and learns a best response against stationary opponents.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Mach. Learn., 2007

When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. ACM, 2007

Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Proceedings 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2007), 2007

Automated Design of Multistage Mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Craig Boutilier

Proceedings of the IJCAI 2007, 2007

Incremental Mechanism Design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the IJCAI 2007, 2007

Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Computational Social Systems and the Internet, 1.7. - 6.7.2007, 2007

Limited Verification of Identities to Induce False-Name-Proofness.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Computational Social Systems and the Internet, 1.7. - 6.7.2007, 2007

Invited talk by winner of IFAAMAS Victor Lesser Distinguished Dissertation Award.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 6th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2007), 2007

2006

Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Artif. Intell., 2006

Computing the optimal strategy to commit to.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Proceedings 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2006), 2006

Learning algorithms for online principal-agent problems (and selling goods online).

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Nikesh Garera

Proceedings of the Machine Learning, 2006

A technique for reducing normal-form games to compute a Nash equilibrium.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 5th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2006), 2006

Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 5th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2006), 2006

A Compact Representation Scheme for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Proceedings, 2006

Nonexistence of Voting Rules That Are Usually Hard to Manipulate.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Proceedings, 2006

Improved Bounds for Computing Kemeny Rankings.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Andrew J. Davenport

Jayant Kalagnanam

Proceedings of the Proceedings, 2006

Computing Slater Rankings Using Similarities among Candidates.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Proceedings, 2006

2005

Common Voting Rules as Maximum Likelihood Estimators.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the UAI '05, 2005

Complexity of (iterated) dominance.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Proceedings 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2005), 2005

Communication complexity of common voting rules.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Proceedings 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2005), 2005

A New Solution Concept for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence, 2005

Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Proceedings, 2005

Mixed-Integer Programming Methods for Finding Nash Equilibria.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Andrew Gilpin

Proceedings of the Proceedings, 2005

Combinatorial Auctions with <i>k-</i>wise Dependent Valuations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Paolo Santi

Proceedings of the Proceedings, 2005

A Generalized Strategy Eliminability Criterion and Computational Methods for Applying It.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Proceedings, 2005

Expressive Negotiation in Settings with Externalities.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Proceedings, 2005

Computational Aspects of Mechanism Design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Proceedings, 2005

2004

Computational criticisms of the revelation principle.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Proceedings 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2004), 2004

Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Proceedings 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2004), 2004

Expressive negotiation over donations to charities.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Proceedings 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2004), 2004

Communication complexity as a lower bound for learning in games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Machine Learning, 2004

Towards a Characterization of Polynomial Preference Elicitation with Value Queries in Combinatorial Auctions (Extended Abstract).

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Paolo Santi

Proceedings of the Learning Theory, 17th Annual Conference on Learning Theory, 2004

An Algorithm for Automatically Designing Deterministic Mechanisms without Payments.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 3rd International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2004), 2004

Revenue Failures and Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges with VCG Payments.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce VI, 2004

Computing Shapley Values, Manipulating Value Division Schemes, and Checking Core Membership in Multi-Issue Domains.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Nineteenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2004

Combinatorial Auctions with Structured Item Graphs.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Jonathan Derryberry

Proceedings of the Nineteenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2004

2003

How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate?

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 9th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK-2003), 2003

Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Proceedings 4th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2003), 2003

Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the IJCAI-03, 2003

Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the IJCAI-03, 2003

Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the IJCAI-03, 2003

Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the IJCAI-03, 2003

BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Machine Learning, 2003

Automated mechanism design: complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2003

2002

Complexity of Mechanism Design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the UAI '02, 2002

Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Eighteenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Fourteenth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence, July 28, 2002

Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]