Vasilis Gkatzelis

Alkmini Sgouritsa

Oper. Res., 2024

Randomized Strategic Facility Location with Predictions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Eric Balkanski

Golnoosh Shahkarami

CoRR, 2024

Clock Auctions Augmented with Unreliable Advice.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Daniel Schoepflin

CoRR, 2024

Getting More by Knowing Less: Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Fair Division.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2024

2023

Online Mechanism Design with Predictions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2023

Optimal Metric Distortion with Predictions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2023

Best of Both Distortion Worlds.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Mohamad Latifian

Nisarg Shah

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

Optimal Data Acquisition with Privacy-Aware Agents.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Rachel Cummings

Hadi Elzayn

Emmanouil Pountourakis

Juba Ziani

Proceedings of the 2023 IEEE Conference on Secure and Trustworthy Machine Learning, 2023

Strategyproof Scheduling with Predictions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Eric Balkanski

Proceedings of the 14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2023

Proportionally Fair Online Allocation of Public Goods with Predictions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2023

EFx Budget-Feasible Allocations with High Nash Welfare.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Marius Garbea

Proceedings of the ECAI 2023 - 26th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, September 30 - October 4, 2023, Kraków, Poland, 2023

2022

Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Simina Brânzei

Ruta Mehta

Oper. Res., 2022

Online Nash Social Welfare Maximization with Predictions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2022 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2022

Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2022 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2022

Improved Price of Anarchy via Predictions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Boulder, CO, USA, July 11, 2022

Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Boulder, CO, USA, July 11, 2022

Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design: Leveraging Predictions for Facility Location.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Boulder, CO, USA, July 11, 2022

Optimal Deterministic Clock Auctions and Beyond.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Giorgos Christodoulou

Daniel Schoepflin

Proceedings of the 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2022

Beyond Cake Cutting: Allocating Homogeneous Divisible Goods.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2022

2021

SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2022.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., 2021

Resource-Aware Cost-Sharing Mechanisms with Priors.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Emmanouil Pountourakis

Alkmini Sgouritsa

Proceedings of the EC '21: The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021

Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Rishi Patel

Emmanouil Pountourakis

Daniel Schoepflin

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 14th International Symposium, 2021

PROPm Allocations of Indivisible Goods to Multiple Agents.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

Fair and Efficient Online Allocations with Normalized Valuations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Alexandros Psomas

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

Achieving Proportionality up to the Maximin Item with Indivisible Goods.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

2020

SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2021.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., 2020

Online Nash Social Welfare via Promised Utilities.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2020

A Truthful Cardinal Mechanism for One-Sided Matching.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2020 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2020

Resource-Aware Protocols for Network Cost-Sharing Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020

Resolving the Optimal Metric Distortion Conjecture.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Daniel Halpern

Nisarg Shah

Proceedings of the 61st IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2020

2019

SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2020.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., 2019

Balanced Ranking with Diversity Constraints.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ke Yang

Julia Stoyanovich

Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

Fair and Efficient Memory Sharing: Confronting Free Riders.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Eric J. Friedman

Christos-Alexandros Psomas

Scott Shenker

Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

2018

SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2019.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., 2018

Approximating the Nash Social Welfare with Indivisible Items.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIAM J. Comput., 2018

2017

SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2018.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., 2017

The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Paul Dütting

Math. Oper. Res., 2017

Coordination Mechanisms, Cost-Sharing, and Approximation Algorithms for Scheduling.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ioannis Caragiannis

Cosimo Vinci

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 13th International Conference, 2017

Participation incentives on a wireless random access erasure collision channel.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Steven Weber

Proceedings of the 12th workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation, 2017

Deferred-Acceptance Auctions for Multiple Levels of Service.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Evangelos Markakis

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

Cost-Sharing Methods for Scheduling Games under Uncertainty.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Giorgos Christodoulou

Alkmini Sgouritsa

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

Convex Program Duality, Fisher Markets, and Nash Social Welfare.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

2016

SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2017.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., 2016

Optimal Cost-Sharing in General Resource Selection Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Konstantinos Kollias

Oper. Res., 2016

2015

SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2016.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Shaddin Dughmi

SIGecom Exch., 2015

Decentralized utilitarian mechanisms for scheduling games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., 2015

Pricing private data.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Christina Aperjis

Bernardo A. Huberman

Electron. Mark., 2015

2014

Optimal Cost-Sharing in Weighted Congestion Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Konstantinos Kollias

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 10th International Conference, 2014

2013

Incentive-Centered Design of Money-Free Mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

PhD thesis, 2013

Mechanism design for fair division: allocating divisible items without payments.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2013

Positive results for mechanism design without money.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the International conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 2013

2012

The Impact of Social Ignorance on Weighted Congestion Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Theory Comput. Syst., 2012

Mechanism Design for Fair Division

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2012

Truthful Mechanisms for Proportionally Fair Allocations

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2012

2011

Inner product spaces for MinSum coordination mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 43rd ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2011

2010

Coordination Mechanisms for Weighted Sum of Completion Times in Machine Scheduling

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]