Ton Storcken

According to our database, Ton Storcken authored at least 21 papers between 1993 and 2022.

Collaborative distances:

• Dijkstra number of five.
• Erdős number of three.

2022

Collective choice rules on restricted domains based on a priori information.

Shashwat Khare, Ton Storcken

Soc. Choice Welf., 2022

2021

An axiomatic characterization of the Slater rule.

Burak Can, Mohsen Pourpouneh, Ton Storcken

Soc. Choice Welf., 2021

2020

On update monotone, continuous, and consistent collective evaluation rules.

Edurne Falcó, Madhuparna Karmokar, Souvik Roy, Ton Storcken

Soc. Choice Welf., 2020

2019

Strategy-proof location of public bads in an interval.

Abhinaba Lahiri, Ton Storcken

Soc. Choice Welf., 2019

2017

Strategy-proof location of public bads in a two-country model.

Abhinaba Lahiri, Hans Peters, Ton Storcken

Math. Soc. Sci., 2017

2015

Measuring polarization in preferences.

Burak Can, Ali Ihsan Ozkes, Ton Storcken

Math. Soc. Sci., 2015

2013

Update monotone preference rules.

Burak Can, Ton Storcken

Math. Soc. Sci., 2013

2012

On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules.

Hans Peters, Souvik Roy, Ton Storcken

Soc. Choice Welf., 2012

2008

Arrow's Possibility Theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences.

Lars Ehlers, Ton Storcken

Games Econ. Behav., 2008

2007

Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity.

Stefan Maus, Hans Peters, Ton Storcken

Soc. Choice Welf., 2007

Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions.

Stefan Maus, Hans Peters, Ton Storcken

Math. Soc. Sci., 2007

Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability.

Stefan Maus, Hans Peters, Ton Storcken

J. Econ. Theory, 2007

2005

Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences.

Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters, Ton Storcken

Int. J. Game Theory, 2005

2004

Centers in Connected Undirected Graphs: An Axiomatic Approach.

Herman Monsuur, Ton Storcken

Oper. Res., 2004

Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems.

Lars Ehlers, Hans Peters, Ton Storcken

Games Econ. Behav., 2004

2002

Choice correspondences for public goods.

Bettina Klaus, Ton Storcken

Soc. Choice Welf., 2002

Nash consistent representation of constitutions: a reaction to the Gibbard paradox.

Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters, Ton Storcken

Math. Soc. Sci., 2002

Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Decision Schemes for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences.

Lars Ehlers, Hans Peters, Ton Storcken

J. Econ. Theory, 2002

1997

Effectivity functions and simple games.

Ton Storcken

Int. J. Game Theory, 1997

1993

Range convexity, continuity, and strategy-proofness of voting schemes.

Hans Peters, Hans van der Stel, Ton Storcken

ZOR Methods Model. Oper. Res., 1993

Generalized median solutions, strategy-proofness and strictly convex norms.

Hans Peters, Hans van der Stel, Ton Storcken

ZOR Methods Model. Oper. Res., 1993