Shahar Dobzinski

Algorithmica, April, 2024

Bilateral Trade with Correlated Values.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ariel Shaulker

Proceedings of the 56th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2024

A Constant-Factor Approximation for Nash Social Welfare with Subadditive Valuations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 56th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2024

2023

Fairness and Incentive Compatibility via Percentage Fees.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

On the Computational Complexity of Mechanism Design in Single-Crossing Settings.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Shiri Ron

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

Simplicity in Auctions Revisited: The Primitive Complexity.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ron Kupfer

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

Rigidity in Mechanism Design and Its Applications.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ariel Shaulker

Proceedings of the 14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2023

2022

Combinatorial auctions with endowment effect.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., 2022

On the hardness of dominant strategy mechanism design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Shiri Ron

Proceedings of the STOC '22: 54th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, Rome, Italy, June 20, 2022

Mechanism Design with Moral Bidders.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2022

2021

Breaking the Logarithmic Barrier for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIAM J. Comput., 2021

(Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., 2021

A Note on the Gains from Trade of the Random-Offerer Mechanism.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ron Kupfer

CoRR, 2021

The communication complexity of payment computation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Shiri Ron

Proceedings of the STOC '21: 53rd Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2021

Are Gross Substitutes a Substitute for Submodular Valuations?

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Uriel Feige

Michal Feldman

Proceedings of the EC '21: The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021

Simple Economies are Almost Optimal.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the EC '21: The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021

2020

Improved Lower Bounds for Truthful Scheduling.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ariel Shaulker

CoRR, 2020

2019

Economic efficiency requires interaction.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., 2019

Optimization with Demand Oracles.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru

Algorithmica, 2019

The communication complexity of local search.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yakov Babichenko

Proceedings of the 51st Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2019

2018

Combinatorial cost sharing.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Shahar Ovadia

SIGecom Exch., 2018

Is Shapley cost sharing optimal?

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., 2018

Revenue Loss in Shrinking Markets.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Nitzan Uziely

Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018

2017

Faster and Simpler Sketches of Valuation Functions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Keren Cohavi

ACM Trans. Algorithms, 2017

2016

Impossibility Results for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. ACM, 2016

Computational Efficiency Requires Simple Taxation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the IEEE 57th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2016

2015

Multi-unit auctions: Beyond Roberts.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Econ. Theory, 2015

Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Robert Kleinberg

Games Econ. Behav., 2015

A Deterministic Algorithm for Maximizing Submodular Functions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ami Mor

CoRR, 2015

On the Greedy Algorithm for Combinatorial Auctions with a Random Order.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ami Mor

CoRR, 2015

Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 11th International Conference, 2015

On the Complexity of Computing an Equilibrium in Combinatorial Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Robert D. Kleinberg

Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2015

2014

Reallocation mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2014

Shared Resource Management via Reward Schemes.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Amir Ronen

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 7th International Symposium, 2014

Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Renato Paes Leme

Proceedings of the Automata, Languages, and Programming - 41st International Colloquium, 2014

2013

On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Shaddin Dughmi

SIAM J. Comput., 2013

Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2013

2012

Optimal Lower Bounds for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Itai Ashlagi

Math. Oper. Res., 2012

Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Michael Schapira

J. Comput. Syst. Sci., 2012

Multi-unit auctions with budget limits.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., 2012

On the Hardness of Welfare Maximization in Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2012

From query complexity to computational complexity.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 44th Symposium on Theory of Computing Conference, 2012

Sketching valuation functions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru

Proceedings of the Twenty-Third Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2012

The computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2012

2011

On Bitcoin and red balloons.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., 2011

Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Peerapong Dhangwatnotai

Shaddin Dughmi

Tim Roughgarden

SIAM J. Comput., 2011

Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Comb., 2011

Optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Robert D. Kleinberg

Proceedings of the 43rd ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2011

An impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 43rd ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2011

Mechanisms for complement-free procurement.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Christos H. Papadimitriou

Yaron Singer

Proceedings of the Proceedings 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2011), 2011

2010

Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Michael Schapira

Math. Oper. Res., 2010

Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2010

Truthfulness via Proxies

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Robert Kleinberg

CoRR, 2010

2009

The power of approximations in mechanism design (על כוחם של קירובים בתכנון מנגנונים.).

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

PhD thesis, 2009

VCG is the best anonymous scheduling mechanism.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Itai Ashlagi

SIGecom Exch., 2009

A Note on the Power of Truthful Approximation Mechanisms

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2009

An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Itai Ashlagi

Proceedings of the Proceedings 10th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2009), 2009

A Modular Approach to Roberts' Theorem.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory, Second International Symposium, 2009

2008

Frequent Manipulability of Elections: The Case of Two Voters.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ariel D. Procaccia

Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics, 4th International Workshop, 2008

On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Mukund Sundararajan

Proceedings of the Proceedings 9th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2008), 2008

Prompt Mechanisms for Online Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Richard Cole

Lisa Fleischer

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory, First International Symposium, 2008

2007

Better mechanisms for combinatorial auctions via maximal-in-range algorithms?

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., 2007

Welfare Maximization in Congestion Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., 2007

Two Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Approximation, 2007

2006

Approximations by Computationally-Efficient VCG-Based Mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Electron. Colloquium Comput. Complex., 2006

An improved approximation algorithm for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]