Shaddin Dughmi

CoRR, 2024

Is Transductive Learning Equivalent to PAC Learning?

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yusuf Hakan Kalayci

Grayson York

CoRR, 2024

Learnability is a Compact Property.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2024

Limitations of Stochastic Selection Problems with Pairwise Independent Priors.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yusuf Hakan Kalayci

Proceedings of the 56th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2024

On Supermodular Contracts and Dense Subgraphs.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ramiro Deo-Campo Vuong

Aditya Prasad

Proceedings of the 2024 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2024

Transductive Learning is Compact.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 38: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2024, 2024

Open Problem: Can Local Regularization Learn All Multiclass Problems?

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty Seventh Annual Conference on Learning Theory, June 30, 2024

Regularization and Optimal Multiclass Learning.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty Seventh Annual Conference on Learning Theory, June 30, 2024

2023

On Sparsification of Stochastic Packing Problems.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yusuf Hakan Kalayci

Proceedings of the 50th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, 2023

2022

Delegated Pandora's Box.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Curtis Bechtel

Proceedings of the EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Boulder, CO, USA, July 11, 2022

Matroid Secretary Is Equivalent to Contention Resolution.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2022

2021

Algorithmic Bayesian Persuasion.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Haifeng Xu

SIAM J. Comput., 2021

Bernoulli Factories and Black-box Reductions in Mechanism Design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. ACM, 2021

Delegated Stochastic Probing.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Curtis Bechtel

Proceedings of the 12th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2021

2020

Bayesian Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Persistent State, with Application to Security Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Vincent Conitzer

Yuan Deng

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 16th International Conference, 2020

The Outer Limits of Contention Resolution on Matroids and Connections to the Secretary Problem.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 47th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, 2020

2019

Introduction to the Special Issue - Algorithmic Game Theory - STOC/FOCS/SODA 2014-2015.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Katrina Ligett

Brendan Lucier

Games Econ. Behav., 2019

On the hardness of designing public signals.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., 2019

Persuasion and Incentives Through the Lens of Duality.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 15th International Conference, 2019

Alea Iacta Est: Auctions, Persuasion, Interim Rules, and Dice.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ruixin Qiang

Proceedings of the 10th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2019

2018

Mitigating the Curse of Correlation in Security Games by Entropy Maximization.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, 2018

On the Distortion of Voting With Multiple Representative Candidates.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yu Cheng

Proceedings of the Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018

2017

Posting Prices with Unknown Distributions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2017

Algorithmic information structure design: a survey.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., 2017

The Curse of Correlation in Security Games and Principle of Max-Entropy.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2017

Algorithmic Persuasion with No Externalities.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Haifeng Xu

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

Of the People: Voting Is More Effective with Representative Candidates.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yu Cheng

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

2016

Optimal Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions and Combinatorial Public Projects via Convex Rounding.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Qiqi Yan

J. ACM, 2016

Private Bayesian Persuasion with Monotone Submodular Objectives.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Haifeng Xu

CoRR, 2016

Persuasion with Limited Communication.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ruixin Qiang

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016

Lottery Pricing Equilibria.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016

Signaling in Bayesian Stackelberg Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems, 2016

2015

Dynamic Pricing with Limited Supply.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2015

SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2016.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Vasilis Gkatzelis

Jason D. Hartline

SIGecom Exch., 2015

Limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Jan Vondrák

Games Econ. Behav., 2015

Algorithmic Signaling of Features in Auction Design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 8th International Symposium, 2015

Security Games with Information Leakage: Modeling and Computation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015

Mixture Selection, Mechanism Design, and Signaling.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yu Cheng

Ho Yee Cheung

Ehsan Emamjomeh-Zadeh

Li Han

Shang-Hua Teng

Proceedings of the IEEE 56th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2015

Exploring Information Asymmetry in Two-Stage Security Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015

2014

Black-Box Randomized Reductions in Algorithmic Mechanism Design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIAM J. Comput., 2014

Signaling in Quasipolynomial time.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2014

Sampling and Representation Complexity of Revenue Maximization.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Li Han

Noam Nisan

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 10th International Conference, 2014

Constrained Signaling in Auction Design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Nicole Immorlica

Aaron Roth

Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2014

On the Hardness of Signaling.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 55th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2014

Solving Zero-Sum Security Games in Discretized Spatio-Temporal Domains.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2014

2013

Constrained signaling for welfare and revenue maximization.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Nicole Immorlica

Aaron Roth

SIGecom Exch., 2013

On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Shahar Dobzinski

SIAM J. Comput., 2013

On the Approximation of Submodular Functions

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2013

2012

Revenue Submodularity.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Mukund Sundararajan

Theory Comput., 2012

Mechanisms for Risk Averse Agents, Without Loss

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yuval Peres

CoRR, 2012

Combinatorial auctions with restricted complements.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2012

Dynamic covering for recommendation systems.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ioannis Antonellis

Anish Das Sarma

Proceedings of the 21st ACM International Conference on Information and Knowledge Management, 2012

2011

Randomization and computation in strategic settings.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

PhD thesis, 2011

Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Peerapong Dhangwatnotai

Shahar Dobzinski

SIAM J. Comput., 2011

An approximately truthful-in-expectation mechanism for combinatorial auctions using value queries

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2011

From Convex Optimization to Randomized Mechanisms: Toward Optimal Combinatorial Auctions for Submodular Bidders

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Qiqi Yan

CoRR, 2011

From convex optimization to randomized mechanisms: toward optimal combinatorial auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Qiqi Yan

Proceedings of the 43rd ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2011

A truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial public projects via convex optimization.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Christos H. Papadimitriou

Proceedings of the Proceedings 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2011), 2011

2010

Inapproximability for VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Michael Schapira

Yaron Singer

Christopher Umans

Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2010

Truthful assignment without money.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Arpita Ghosh

Proceedings of the Proceedings 11th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2010), 2010

Truthfulness via smoothed complexity.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory, 2010

2009

Space Constrained Dynamic Covering

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ioannis Antonellis

Anish Das Sarma

CoRR, 2009

Submodular Functions: Extensions, Distributions, and Algorithms. A Survey

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2009

Amplified Hardness of Approximation for VCG-Based Mechanisms

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]