Santiago R. Balseiro

Orcid: 0000-0002-0012-3292

Affiliations:
  • Columbia University, New York, NY, USA


According to our database1, Santiago R. Balseiro authored at least 48 papers between 2010 and 2024.

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Bibliography

2024
Survey of Dynamic Resource-Constrained Reward Collection Problems: Unified Model and Analysis.
Oper. Res., 2024

Mechanism Design Under Approximate Incentive Compatibility.
Oper. Res., 2024

Auto-bidding and Auctions in Online Advertising: A Survey.
CoRR, 2024

Battery Operations in Electricity Markets: Strategic Behavior and Distortions.
CoRR, 2024

A Field Guide for Pacing Budget and ROS Constraints.
Proceedings of the Forty-first International Conference on Machine Learning, 2024

2023
Contextual Standard Auctions with Budgets: Revenue Equivalence and Efficiency Guarantees.
Manag. Sci., November, 2023

Contextual Bandits with Cross-Learning.
Math. Oper. Res., August, 2023

Incentive-Compatible Assortment Optimization for Sponsored Products.
Manag. Sci., August, 2023

The Best of Many Worlds: Dual Mirror Descent for Online Allocation Problems.
Oper. Res., January, 2023

Dynamic Pricing for Reusable Resources: The Power of Two Prices.
CoRR, 2023

Joint Feedback Loop for Spend and Return-On-Spend Constraints.
CoRR, 2023

Online Resource Allocation under Horizon Uncertainty.
Proceedings of the Abstract Proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGMETRICS International Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems, 2023

Single-Leg Revenue Management with Advice.
Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

Robust Auction Design with Support Information.
Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

Robust Budget Pacing with a Single Sample.
Proceedings of the International Conference on Machine Learning, 2023

2022
Dynamic Double Auctions: Toward First Best.
Oper. Res., 2022

Uniformly Bounded Regret in Dynamic Fair Allocation.
CoRR, 2022

From Online Optimization to PID Controllers: Mirror Descent with Momentum.
CoRR, 2022

Optimal Mechanisms for Value Maximizers with Budget Constraints via Target Clipping.
Proceedings of the EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Boulder, CO, USA, July 11, 2022

On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design.
Proceedings of the EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Boulder, CO, USA, July 11, 2022

2021
Multistage Intermediation in Display Advertising.
Manuf. Serv. Oper. Manag., 2021

Dynamic Pricing of Relocating Resources in Large Networks.
Manag. Sci., 2021

On the Futility of Dynamics in Robust Mechanism Design.
Oper. Res., 2021

Budget-Management Strategies in Repeated Auctions.
Oper. Res., 2021

Contextual First-Price Auctions with Budgets.
CoRR, 2021

Non-Excludable Dynamic Mechanism Design.
Proceedings of the 2021 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2021

The Landscape of Auto-bidding Auctions: Value versus Utility Maximization.
Proceedings of the EC '21: The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021

Robust Auction Design in the Auto-bidding World.
Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 34: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2021, 2021

Regularized Online Allocation Problems: Fairness and Beyond.
Proceedings of the 38th International Conference on Machine Learning, 2021

2020
Online Display Advertising Markets: A Literature Review and Future Directions.
Inf. Syst. Res., 2020

Budget-Constrained Incentive Compatibility for Stationary Mechanisms.
Proceedings of the EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020

Dual Mirror Descent for Online Allocation Problems.
Proceedings of the 37th International Conference on Machine Learning, 2020

2019
Learning in Repeated Auctions with Budgets: Regret Minimization and Equilibrium.
Manag. Sci., 2019

Multiagent Mechanism Design Without Money.
Oper. Res., 2019

Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget-Constrained Buyers Under Limited Commitment.
Oper. Res., 2019

Approximations to Stochastic Dynamic Programs via Information Relaxation Duality.
Oper. Res., 2019

Dynamic Double Auctions: Towards First Best.
Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2019

Dynamic Pricing of Relocating Resources in Large Networks: Extended Abstract.
Proceedings of the Abstracts of the 2019 SIGMETRICS/Performance Joint International Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems, 2019

2018
Dynamic Mechanisms with Martingale Utilities.
Manag. Sci., 2018

Static Routing in Stochastic Scheduling: Performance Guarantees and Asymptotic Optimality.
Oper. Res., 2018

2017
Optimal Contracts for Intermediaries in Online Advertising.
Oper. Res., 2017

Dynamic Revenue Sharing.
Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 30: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2017, 2017

2016
Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability.
Games Econ. Behav., 2016

2015
Repeated Auctions with Budgets in Ad Exchanges: Approximations and Design.
Manag. Sci., 2015

2014
Yield Optimization of Display Advertising with Ad Exchange.
Manag. Sci., 2014

2013
Auctions for online display advertising exchanges: approximations and design.
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2013

2011
An Ant Colony algorithm hybridized with insertion heuristics for the Time Dependent Vehicle Routing Problem with Time Windows.
Comput. Oper. Res., 2011

2010
The Cost of Moral Hazard and Limited Liability in the Principal-Agent Problem.
Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics - 6th International Workshop, 2010


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