S. Matthew Weinberg

CoRR, 2024

Computing Optimal Manipulations in Cryptographic Self-Selection Proof-of-Stake Protocols.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis

CoRR, 2024

Settling the Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers over Independent Items.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2024

Contracting with a Learning Agent.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Joshua R. Wang

CoRR, 2024

Settling the Communication Complexity of VCG-Based Mechanisms for All Approximation Guarantees.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Frederick V. Qiu

Proceedings of the 56th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2024

To Regulate or Not to Regulate: Using Revenue Maximization Tools to Maximize Consumer Utility.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Kira Goldner

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 17th International Symposium, 2024

Simple and Optimal Online Contention Resolution Schemes for k-Uniform Matroids.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Atanas Dinev

Proceedings of the 15th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2024

On the Cut-Query Complexity of Approximating Max-Cut.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Orestis Plevrakis

Seyoon Ragavan

Proceedings of the 51st International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, 2024

Communication Separations for Truthful Auctions: Breaking the Two-Player Barrier.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 65th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2024

Profitable Manipulations of Cryptographic Self-Selection Are Statistically Detectable.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies, 2024

Optimal RANDAO Manipulation in Ethereum.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Kaya Alpturer

Proceedings of the 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies, 2024

2023

Undetectable Selfish Mining.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Maryam Bahrani

CoRR, 2023

q-Partitioning Valuations: Exploring the Space Between Subadditive and Fractionally Subadditive Valuations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Kiril Bangachev

CoRR, 2023

Selling to Multiple No-Regret Buyers.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 19th International Conference, 2023

Optimal Stopping with Multi-dimensional Comparative Loss Aversion.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Linda Cai

Joshua Gardner

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 19th International Conference, 2023

An Improved Lower Bound for Matroid Intersection Prophet Inequalities.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Santhoshini Velusamy

Proceedings of the 14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2023

2022

Separating the Communication Complexity of Truthful and Nontruthful Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Sepehr Assadi

Hrishikesh Khandeparkar

SIAM J. Comput., June, 2022

Bitcoin: A Natural Oligopoly.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Nick Arnosti

Manag. Sci., 2022

Tight Bounds on 3-Team Manipulations in Randomized Death Match.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Atanas Dinev

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 18th International Conference, 2022

Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms are not Locally-Implementable.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Zixin Zhou

Proceedings of the EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Boulder, CO, USA, July 11, 2022

The Derby Game: An Ordering-based Colonel Blotto Game.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Akash Gaonkar

Divya Raghunathan

Proceedings of the EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Boulder, CO, USA, July 11, 2022

Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ye Lin Sally Hahn

Catherine Yu

Proceedings of the EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Boulder, CO, USA, July 11, 2022

Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules with Multiple Prizes.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Emily Dale

Jessica Fielding

Hari Ramakrishnan

Sacheth Sathyanarayanan

Proceedings of the EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Boulder, CO, USA, July 11, 2022

On Infinite Separations Between Simple and Optimal Mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Alexandros Psomas

Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 35: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2022, 2022

Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for All Distributions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2022

2021

A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Nikhil R. Devanur

SIAM J. Comput., 2021

The Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-dimensional Revenue Maximization.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yannai A. Gonczarowski

J. ACM, 2021

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Oper. Res., 2021

On Symmetries in Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 17th International Conference, 2021

Formal Barriers to Simple Algorithms for the Matroid Secretary Problem.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 17th International Conference, 2021

Exponential communication separations between notions of selfishness.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the STOC '21: 53rd Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2021

Binary Scoring Rules that Incentivize Precision.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Eric Neyman

Georgy Noarov

Proceedings of the EC '21: The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021

Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the EC '21: The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021

Prior-free Dynamic Mechanism Design With Limited Liability.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Jon Schneider

Proceedings of the EC '21: The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021

Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules in the Probabilistic Setting.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Kimberly Ding

Proceedings of the 12th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2021

Auction Learning as a Two-Player Game.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Jad Rahme

Samy Jelassi

Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Learning Representations, 2021

A Permutation-Equivariant Neural Network Architecture For Auction Design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

2020

Editors' introduction.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Inbal Talgam-Cohen

SIGecom Exch., 2020

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. ACM, 2020

Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms are not Local.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Zixin Zhou

CoRR, 2020

Credible, Truthful, and Bounded-Round Mechanisms via Cryptographic Commitments.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2020

When to Limit Market Entry under Mandatory Purchase.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Kira Goldner

CoRR, 2020

Separating the communication complexity of truthful and non-truthful combinatorial auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Sepehr Assadi

Hrishikesh Khandeparkar

Proceedings of the 52nd Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2020

Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020

Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020

On the (in-)approximability of Bayesian Revenue Maximization for a Combinatorial Buyer.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Natalie Collina

Proceedings of the EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020

Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules: On Large Manipulating Sets and Cover-Consistence.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 11th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2020

Optimal Single-Choice Prophet Inequalities from Samples.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Jack Z. Wang

Proceedings of the 11th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2020

New Query Lower Bounds for Submodular Function Minimization.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 11th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2020

Implementation in Advised Strategies: Welfare Guarantees from Posted-Price Mechanisms When Demand Queries Are NP-Hard.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Linda Cai

Clayton Thomas

Proceedings of the 11th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2020

Decentralized Reinforcement Learning: Global Decision-Making via Local Economic Transactions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 37th International Conference on Machine Learning, 2020

Asynchronous Majority Dynamics in Preferential Attachment Trees.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 47th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, 2020

Subsidy Allocations in the Presence of Income Shocks.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Rediet Abebe

Jon M. Kleinberg

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2020

2019

Matroid prophet inequalities and applications to multi-dimensional mechanism design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., 2019

Prior independent mechanisms via prophet inequalities with limited information.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Pablo Daniel Azar

Games Econ. Behav., 2019

Approximation Schemes for a Buyer with Independent Items via Symmetries.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2019

Selling a Single Item with Negative Externalities.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Matheus Xavier Ferreira

Proceedings of the World Wide Web Conference, 2019

Persuasion and Incentives Through the Lens of Duality.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 15th International Conference, 2019

Optimal (and benchmark-optimal) competition complexity for additive buyers over independent items.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Hedyeh Beyhaghi

Proceedings of the 51st Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2019

Approximation Schemes for a Unit-Demand Buyer with Independent Items via Symmetries.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 60th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2019

Settling the Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Two Subadditive Buyers.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 60th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2019

Smoothed Analysis of Multi-Item Auctions with Correlated Values.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Alexandros Psomas

Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2019

Formal Barriers to Longest-Chain Proof-of-Stake Protocols.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2019

Multi-armed Bandit Problems with Strategic Arms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Conference on Learning Theory, 2019

2018

Simple Mechanisms for a Subadditive Buyer and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2018

Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraints.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Nikhil R. Devanur

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2018

Editors' introduction.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Hu Fu

SIGecom Exch., 2018

Complement-Free Couples Must Communicate: A Hardness Result for Two-Player Combinatorial Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2018

Arbitrum: Scalable, private smart contracts.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 27th USENIX Security Symposium, 2018

The menu complexity of "one-and-a-half-dimensional" mechanism design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2018

On Simultaneous Two-player Combinatorial Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Jieming Mao

Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2018

Selling to a No-Regret Buyer.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018

Computing Exact Minimum Cuts Without Knowing the Graph.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Tselil Schramm

Proceedings of the 9th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2018

2017

The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements: Abstract.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget Constrained Buyer: The General Case.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Nikhil R. Devanur

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

Condorcet-Consistent and Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Jon Schneider

Proceedings of the 8th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2017

Discovering valuations and enforcing truthfulness in a deadline-aware scheduler.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2017 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, 2017

2016

Reducing Bayesian Mechanism Design to Algorithm Design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Encyclopedia of Algorithms, 2016

Signal to noise in matching markets.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

James Zou

CoRR, 2016

Parallel algorithms for select and partition with noisy comparisons.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Jieming Mao

Proceedings of the 48th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2016

Interpolating Between Truthful and non-Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Jieming Mao

Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2016

On the Instability of Bitcoin Without the Block Reward.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2016

2015

Pricing lotteries.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Econ. Theory, 2015

Simple Mechanisms for a Combinatorial Buyer and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2015

Bayesian Truthful <i>Mechanisms</i> for Job Scheduling from Bi-criterion Approximation <i>Algorithms</i>.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2015

Simple Auctions with Simple Strategies.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2015

Game Theory based Peer Grading Mechanisms for MOOCs.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

William Wu

Nicolaas Kaashoek

Christos Tzamos

Proceedings of the Second ACM Conference on Learning @ Scale, 2015

2014

Algorithms for strategic agents.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

PhD thesis, 2014

Bayesian Truthful Mechanisms for Job Scheduling from Bi-criterion Approximation Algorithms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2014

Prophet Inequalities with Limited Information.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Pablo Daniel Azar

Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2014

Reaching Consensus via Non-Bayesian Asynchronous Learning in Social Networks.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Approximation, 2014

2013

Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and other Generalizations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2013

Optimal and Efficient Parametric Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Pablo Daniel Azar

Silvio Micali

Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2013

Understanding Incentives: Mechanism Design Becomes Algorithm Design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 54th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2013

2012

Matroid prophet inequalities.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 44th Symposium on Theory of Computing Conference, 2012

Symmetries and optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2012

Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 53rd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2012

2011

On optimal multidimensional mechanism design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., 2011

On Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Electron. Colloquium Comput. Complex., 2011

An Algorithmic Characterization of Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]