Patrick Lederer

Orcid: 0000-0001-9787-8941

According to our database1, Patrick Lederer authored at least 17 papers between 2021 and 2024.

Collaborative distances:
  • Dijkstra number2 of four.
  • Erdős number3 of four.

Timeline

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Bibliography

2024
Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes.
Soc. Choice Welf., August, 2024

Strategic Manipulation in Social Choice Theory.
PhD thesis, 2024

Bivariate scoring rules: Unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule.
J. Econ. Theory, 2024

Committee Monotonic Proportional Representation: A New Voting Rule and Impossibility Results.
CoRR, 2024

The Squared Kemeny Rule for Averaging Rankings.
CoRR, 2024

The Metric Distortion of Randomized Social Choice Functions: C1 Maximal Lottery Rules and Simulations.
CoRR, 2024

Refined Characterizations of Approval-Based Committee Scoring Rules.
Proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2024

Participation Incentives in Approval-Based Committee Elections.
Proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2024

2023
Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences.
Games Econ. Behav., November, 2023

Characterizations of Sequential Valuation Rules.
Proceedings of the 2023 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2023

Strategyproof Social Decision Schemes on Super Condorcet Domains.
Proceedings of the 2023 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2023

Strategyproofness and Proportionality in Party-Approval Multiwinner Elections.
Proceedings of the Thirty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2023

2022
On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions.
J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2022

The Incompatibility of Strategy-Proofness and Representation in Party-Approval Multi-Winner Elections.
Arch. Formal Proofs, 2022

2021
Characterizing the Top Cycle via Strategyproofness.
CoRR, 2021

Strategyproof Randomized Social Choice for Restricted Sets of Utility Functions.
Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

Non-manipulability in Set-valued and Probabilistic Social Choice Theory.
Proceedings of the AAMAS '21: 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2021


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