Nick Gravin

Zhile Jiang

CoRR, 2024

Strategic Facility Location via Predictions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Qingyun Chen

Sungjin Im

CoRR, 2024

On Robustness to k-wise Independence of Optimal Bayesian Mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Zhiqi Wang

CoRR, 2024

Bidder Selection Problem in Position Auctions: A Fast and Simple Algorithm via Poisson Approximation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Nikolai Gravin

Yixuan Even Xu

Renfei Zhou

Proceedings of the ACM on Web Conference 2024, 2024

On Robustness to k-Wise Independence of Optimal Bayesian Mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Zhiqi Wang

Proceedings of the 65th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2024

2023

Prophet Inequality for Bipartite Matching: Merits of Being Simple and Nonadaptive.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Hongao Wang

Math. Oper. Res., February, 2023

Bidder Selection Problem in Position Auctions via Poisson Approximation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yixuan Even Xu

Renfei Zhou

CoRR, 2023

Online resource allocation in Markov Chains.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2023, 2023

"Who is Next in Line?" On the Significance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Bayesian Online Settings.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2023 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2023

Bidder Subset Selection Problem in Auction Design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2023 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2023

Online Ordinal Problems: Optimality of Comparison-based Algorithms and their Cardinal Complexity.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Enze Sun

Proceedings of the 64th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2023

2022

Introduction to the Special Issue on WINE'20: Part 1.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2022

Prophet Matching with General Arrivals.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Math. Oper. Res., 2022

The Cardinal Complexity of Comparison-based Online Algorithms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Enze Sun

CoRR, 2022

On the Significance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Prophet Inequality.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2022

Optimal Prophet Inequality with Less than One Sample.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Hao Li

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 18th International Conference, 2022

Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Boulder, CO, USA, July 11, 2022

General Graphs are Easier than Bipartite Graphs: Tight Bounds for Secretary Matching.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Boulder, CO, USA, July 11, 2022

Lookahead Auctions with Pooling.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 15th International Symposium, 2022

2021

A Simple Mechanism for a Budget-Constrained Buyer.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2021

Relaxing the Independence Assumption in Sequential Posted Pricing, Prophet Inequality, and Random Bipartite Matching.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 17th International Conference, 2021

Concentration bounds for almost k-wise independence with applications to non-uniform security.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2021 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2021

Online Stochastic Matching with Edge Arrivals.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Kangning Wang

Proceedings of the 48th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, 2021

2020

Optimal Budget-Feasible Mechanisms for Additive Valuations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2020

Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., 2020

Secretary Matching with General Arrivals.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2020

Online Stochastic Max-Weight Matching: Prophet Inequality for Vertex and Edge Arrival Models.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020

2019

Correlation-Robust Analysis of Single Item Auction.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2019

Prophet Inequality for Bipartite Matching: Merits of Being Simple and Non Adaptive.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Nikolai Gravin

Hongao Wang

Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2019

Envy-Freeness Up to Any Item with High Nash Welfare: The Virtue of Donating Items.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ioannis Caragiannis

Xin Huang

Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2019

2018

Correlation-robust mechanism design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Pinian Lu

SIGecom Exch., 2018

Monopoly pricing with buyer search.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2018

Separation in Correlation-Robust Monopolist Problem with Budget.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2018

Testing Symmetric Markov Chains From a Single Trajectory.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Constantinos Daskalakis

Nishanth Dikkala

Proceedings of the Conference On Learning Theory, 2018

2017

Worst-Case Mechanism Design via Bayesian Analysis.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIAM J. Comput., 2017

Testing from One Sample: Is the casino really using a riffle shuffle?

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Constantinos Daskalakis

Nishanth Dikkala

CoRR, 2017

Short Sequences of Improvement Moves Lead to Approximate Equilibria in Constraint Satisfaction Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ioannis Caragiannis

Angelo Fanelli

Algorithmica, 2017

Liquid Price of Anarchy.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 10th International Symposium, 2017

Tight Lower Bounds for Multiplicative Weights Algorithmic Families.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yuval Peres

Balasubramanian Sivan

Proceedings of the 44th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, 2017

2016

Combinatorial Walrasian Equilibrium.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Michal Feldman

SIAM J. Comput., 2016

Towards Optimal Algorithms for Prediction with Expert Advice.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yuval Peres

Balasubramanian Sivan

Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2016

Procrastination with Variable Present Bias.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Nicole Immorlica

Emmanouil Pountourakis

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016

2015

Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation, and Structure.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2015

Dynamics of Profit-Sharing Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Internet Math., 2015

On Welfare Approximation and Stable Pricing.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Michal Feldman

CoRR, 2015

Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Michal Feldman

Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2015

Competitive Analysis via Benchmark Decomposition.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Nikolai Gravin

Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2015

2014

Truthful Generalized Assignments via Stable Matching.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Math. Oper. Res., 2014

Optimal competitive auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2014

2013

Structure Results for Multiple Tilings in 3D.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Mihail N. Kolountzakis

Sinai Robins

Dmitry Shiryaev

Discret. Comput. Geom., 2013

Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Symposium on Theory of Computing Conference, 2013

Competitive Auctions for Markets with Positive Externalities.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Automata, Languages, and Programming - 40th International Colloquium, 2013

2012

Computing approximate pure Nash equilibria in congestion games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., 2012

The Inverse Moment Problem for Convex Polytopes.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Discret. Comput. Geom., 2012

Translational tilings by a polytope, with multiplicity.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Sinai Robins

Dmitry Shiryaev

Comb., 2012

Budget feasible mechanism design: from prior-free to bayesian.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 44th Symposium on Theory of Computing Conference, 2012

2011

A note on k-shortest paths problem.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Graph Theory, 2011

Budget Feasible Mechanism Design via Random Sampling

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2011

Computing approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2011

Mechanism Design without Money via Stable Matching

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2011

Efficient computation of approximate pure Nash equilibria

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2011

On the Approximability of Budget Feasible Mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2011

Efficient Computation of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the IEEE 52nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2011

2010

On the Continuous CNN Problem.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

John Augustine

Proceedings of the Algorithms and Computation - 21st International Symposium, 2010

Frugal Mechanism Design via Spectral Techniques.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 51th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2010

Time Optimal d-List Colouring of a Graph.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Computer Science, 2010

2009

Refining the Cost of Cheap Labor in Set System Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Edith Elkind