Nathanaël Barrot

Orcid: 0000-0003-1108-7183

According to our database1, Nathanaël Barrot authored at least 14 papers between 2013 and 2022.

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Bibliography

2022
Robust Weighted Partial Maximum Satisfiability Problem: Challenge to σ<sub>2</sub><sup>P</sup>-Complete Problem.
Proceedings of the PRICAI 2022: Trends in Artificial Intelligence, 2022

2020
Strategyproof and fair matching mechanism for ratio constraints.
Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2020

Peer Reviewing in Participatory Guarantee Systems: Modelisation and Algorithmic Aspects.
Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2020

Strategy-Proof and Non-Wasteful Multi-Unit Auction via Social Network.
Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2020

2019
Stable and Envy-free Partitions in Hedonic Games.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

Unknown Agents in Friends Oriented Hedonic Games: Stability and Complexity.
Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

2018
Strategyproof and Fair Matching Mechanism for Union of Symmetric M-convex Constraints.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018

2017
Core Stability in Hedonic Games among Friends and Enemies: Impact of Neutrals.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017

Manipulation of Hamming-based Approval Voting for Multiple Referenda and Committee Elections.
Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, 2017

2016
Sur les aspects computationnels du vote par approbation. (Computational Aspects of Approval Voting).
PhD thesis, 2016

Conditional and Sequential Approval Voting on Combinatorial Domains.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016

2015
Vote par approbation pour les élections à vainqueurs multiples. Une famille générale de règles, leur complexité algorithmique et leur manipulabilité.
Rev. d'Intelligence Artif., 2015

Multiple Referenda and Multiwinner Elections Using Hamming Distances: Complexity and Manipulability.
Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2015

2013
Possible Winners in Approval Voting.
Proceedings of the Algorithmic Decision Theory - Third International Conference, 2013


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