Michal Feldman

Maya Schlesinger

CoRR, 2024

Choosing Behind the Veil: Tight Bounds for Identity-Blind Online Algorithms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Zhihao Gavin Tang

CoRR, 2024

Private Interdependent Valuations: New Bounds for Single-Item Auctions and Matroids.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2024

The Competition Complexity of Prophet Inequalities.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2024

Algorithmic Contract Design (Keynote).

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 56th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2024

Fair Division via Quantile Shares.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 56th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2024

Combinatorial Contracts Beyond Gross Substitutes.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Paul Dütting

Yoav Gal Tzur

Proceedings of the 2024 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2024

On the (In)approximability of Combinatorial Contracts.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Maya Schlesinger

Proceedings of the 15th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2024

On Optimal Tradeoffs between EFX and Nash Welfare.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Simon Mauras

Tomasz Ponitka

Proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2024

Pandora's Problem with Deadlines.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2024

2023

Correction: A spatial vaccination strategy to reduce the risk of vaccine-resistant variants.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

PLoS Comput. Biol., October, 2023

On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Amitay Dror

Erel Segal-Halevi

J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2023

Simultaneous 2nd price item auctions with no-underbidding.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Galia Shabtai

Games Econ. Behav., 2023

Optimal Metric Distortion with Predictions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2023

Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2023

Multi-agent Contracts.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 55th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2023

"Who is Next in Line?" On the Significance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Bayesian Online Settings.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2023 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2023

Interdependent Public Projects.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2023 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2023

Ambiguous Contracts.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Paul Duetting

Daniel Peretz

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

Pandora's Problem with Combinatorial Cost.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

Ambiguous Contracts.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 16th International Symposium, 2023

Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Agents.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Federico Fusco

Simon Mauras

Rebecca Reiffenhäuser

Proceedings of the 50th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, 2023

Constant Approximation for Private Interdependent Valuations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 64th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2023

2022

Max-Min Greedy Matching.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Adv. Math. Commun., 2022

A spatial vaccination strategy to reduce the risk of vaccine-resistant variants.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

PLoS Comput. Biol., 2022

Prophet Matching with General Arrivals.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Math. Oper. Res., 2022

On the Significance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Prophet Inequality.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2022

Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Boulder, CO, USA, July 11, 2022

General Graphs are Easier than Bipartite Graphs: Tight Bounds for Secretary Matching.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Boulder, CO, USA, July 11, 2022

Lookahead Auctions with Pooling.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 15th International Symposium, 2022

Two-Price Equilibrium.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Galia Shabtai

Aner Wolfenfeld

Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022

Almost Full EFX Exists for Four Agents.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022

2021

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Oper. Res., 2021

Competitive Equilibria with Unequal Budgets: Supporting Arbitrary Pareto Optimal Allocations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2021

(Almost Full) EFX Exists for Four Agents (and Beyond).

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2021

An Economics-Based Analysis of RANKING for Online Bipartite Matching.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 4th Symposium on Simplicity in Algorithms, 2021

Are Gross Substitutes a Substitute for Submodular Valuations?

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Shahar Dobzinski

Proceedings of the EC '21: The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021

Prophet Inequality with Competing Agents.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ron Kupfer

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 14th International Symposium, 2021

On a Competitive Secretary Problem with Deferred Selections.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ron Kupfer

Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

Combinatorial Contracts.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 62nd IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2021

PoA of Simple Auctions with Interdependent Values.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

2020

Pricing Multi-Unit Markets.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2020

A general framework for endowment effects in combinatorial markets.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., 2020

Approximate Modularity Revisited.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Inbal Talgam-Cohen

SIAM J. Comput., 2020

Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Nonstochastic Inputs.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIAM J. Comput., 2020

Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., 2020

Secretary Matching with General Arrivals.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2020

Price of Anarchy of Simple Auctions with Interdependent Values.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2020

On the Power and Limits of Dynamic Pricing in Combinatorial Markets.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ben Berger

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 16th International Conference, 2020

Online Stochastic Max-Weight Matching: Prophet Inequality for Vertex and Edge Arrival Models.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020

Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yannai A. Gonczarowski

Inbal Talgam-Cohen

Proceedings of the EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020

Designing Committees for Mitigating Biases.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2020

2019

Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2019

Online Random Sampling for Budgeted Settings.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Adi Vardi

Theory Comput. Syst., 2019

Stable Secretaries.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Algorithmica, 2019

Auction Design under Interdependent Values (Invited Talk).

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 46th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, 2019

Settling the Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Two Subadditive Buyers.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 60th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2019

Efficient Allocation of Free Stuff.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, 2019

2018

Introduction to the Special Issue on EC'15.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Michael Schwarz

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2018

Complement-Free Couples Must Communicate: A Hardness Result for Two-Player Combinatorial Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2018

An Economic-Based Analysis of RANKING for Online Bipartite Matching.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2018

Prompt Scheduling for Selfish Agents.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2018

99% Revenue via Enhanced Competition.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Aviad Rubinstein

Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018

Prophets and Secretaries with Overbooking.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ilan Nehama

Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018

Interdependent Values without Single-Crossing.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018

Truthful Prompt Scheduling for Minimizing Sum of Completion Times.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 26th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms, 2018

2017

Pricing Identical Items.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2017

Makespan Minimization via Posted Prices.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Amos Fiat

Alan Roytman

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements: Abstract.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

Pricing social goods.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 12th workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation, 2017

The Efficiency of Best-Response Dynamics.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yuval Snappir

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 10th International Symposium, 2017

Liquid Price of Anarchy.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 10th International Symposium, 2017

Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Non-Stochastic Inputs.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 58th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2017

2016

Do Capacity Constraints Constrain Coalitions?

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ofir Geri

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2016

Combinatorial Walrasian Equilibrium.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Nick Gravin

SIAM J. Comput., 2016

Simple Auctions For Agents With Complements.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2016

Posted Prices, Smoothness, and Combinatorial Prophet Inequalities.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2016

Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 12th International Conference, 2016

The price of anarchy in large games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 48th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2016

Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Complements.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016

On Voting and Facility Location.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Amos Fiat

Iddan Golomb

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016

Lottery Pricing Equilibria.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016

The Invisible Hand of Dynamic Market Pricing.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016

Online Pricing with Strategic and Patient Buyers.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 29: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2016, 2016

Oblivious Rounding and the Integrality Gap.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Inbal Talgam-Cohen

Proceedings of the Approximation, 2016

Variations on the Hotelling-Downs Model.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Amos Fiat

Svetlana Obraztsova

Proceedings of the Thirtieth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016

2015

Convergence to Strong Equilibrium in Network Design Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGMETRICS Perform. Evaluation Rev., 2015

Capacitated Network Design Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Tom Ron

Theory Comput. Syst., 2015

Convergence of best-response dynamics in games with conflicting congestion effects.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Inf. Process. Lett., 2015

On Welfare Approximation and Stable Pricing.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Nick Gravin

CoRR, 2015

Truthful Secretaries with Budgets.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Adi Vardi

CoRR, 2015

Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 11th International Conference, 2015

Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Nick Gravin

Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2015

Implementing the Wisdom of Waze.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Shoshana Vasserman

Avinatan Hassidim

Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015

How Robust Is the Wisdom of the Crowds?

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015

A Unified Framework for Strong Price of Anarchy in Clustering Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Automata, Languages, and Programming - 42nd International Colloquium, 2015

2014

Signaling Schemes for Revenue Maximization.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2014

Introduction.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Kevin Leyton-Brown

Games Econ. Behav., 2014

A Unifying Hierarchy of Valuations with Complements and Substitutes.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Electron. Colloquium Comput. Complex., 2014

Clearing Markets via Bundles.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 7th International Symposium, 2014

Sequential decision making with vector outcomes.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science, 2014

Reaching Consensus via Non-Bayesian Asynchronous Learning in Social Networks.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Approximation, 2014

2013

Introduction to the Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2013

Adversarial Leakage in Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIAM J. Discret. Math., 2013

Mechanism design with a restricted action space.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Liad Blumrosen

Games Econ. Behav., 2013

Approximate strong equilibria in job scheduling games with two uniformly related machines.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Discret. Appl. Math., 2013

Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Vasilis Syrgkanis

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 9th International Conference, 2013

The Asymmetric Matrix Partition Problem.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 9th International Conference, 2013

Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Symposium on Theory of Computing Conference, 2013

Strategyproof facility location and the least squares objective.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yoav Wilf

Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2013

Pricing public goods for private sale.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2013

Efficient parking allocation as online bipartite matching with posted prices.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yiling Chen

Proceedings of the International conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 2013

2012

Computing optimal contracts in combinatorial agencies.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yuval Emek

Theor. Comput. Sci., 2012

Bayesian ignorance.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Theor. Comput. Sci., 2012

Envy-Free Makespan Approximation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIAM J. Comput., 2012

Combinatorial agency.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Econ. Theory, 2012

Conflicting Congestion Effects in Resource Allocation Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Oper. Res., 2012

On the approximability of Dodgson and Young elections.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

Artif. Intell., 2012

Revenue maximizing envy-free multi-unit auctions with budgets.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2012

Mechanism design on discrete lines and cycles.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2012

Mechanisms and Impossibilities for Truthful, Envy-Free Allocations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

John K. Lai

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 5th International Symposium, 2012

Stability scores: measuring coalitional stability.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2012

Mastering multi-player games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2012

On Maxsum Fair Cake Divisions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2012

2011

Randomized Strategyproof Mechanisms for Facility Location and the Mini-Sum-of-Squares Objective

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yoav Wilf

CoRR, 2011

Stability Scores: Stability and Revenue Enhancement in Ad Auctions

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2011

Revenue Enhancement in Ad Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics - 7th International Workshop, 2011

Truth, Envy, and Truthful Market Clearing Bundle Pricing.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics - 7th International Workshop, 2011

Solving Cooperative Reliability Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the UAI 2011, 2011

Dynamic Inefficiency: Anarchy without Stability.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory, 4th International Symposium, 2011

Economical Graph Discovery.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Innovations in Computer Science, 2011

2010

Structured coalitions in resource selection games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

ACM Trans. Intell. Syst. Technol., 2010

Strategyproof Approximation of the Minimax on Networks.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Math. Oper. Res., 2010

Mixed Strategies in Combinatorial Agency.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2010

A note on competitive diffusion through social networks.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Inf. Process. Lett., 2010

Walking in circles.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Discret. Math., 2010

On the Interplay between Incentive Compatibility and Envy Freeness

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2010

Truth and Envy in Capacitated Allocation Games

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2010

Envy-free makespan approximation: extended abstract.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Proceedings 11th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2010), 2010

Playing Games without Observing Payoffs.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Adam Kalai

Proceedings of the Innovations in Computer Science, 2010

2009

The Proportional-Share Allocation Market for Computational Resources.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Kevin Lai

Li Zhang

IEEE Trans. Parallel Distributed Syst., 2009

A prescriptive approach for playing games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., 2009

Approximate Strong Equilibrium in Job Scheduling Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2009

Efficient graph topologies in network routing games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Amir Epstein

Yishay Mansour

Games Econ. Behav., 2009

Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Amir Epstein

Yishay Mansour

Games Econ. Behav., 2009

Strong price of anarchy.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Nir Andelman

Yishay Mansour

Games Econ. Behav., 2009

Strategyproof Approximation Mechanisms for Location on Networks

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2009

Optimal Incentives for Participation with Type-Dependent Externalities.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ran Tessler

Yoav Wilf

Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics, 5th International Workshop, 2009

Computing Optimal Contracts in Series-Parallel Heterogeneous Combinatorial Agencies.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yuval Emek

Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics, 5th International Workshop, 2009

Partition Equilibrium.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory, Second International Symposium, 2009

Free-Riding and Free-Labor in Combinatorial Agency.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory, Second International Symposium, 2009

2007

Hidden-Action in Network Routing.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., 2007

2006

Free-riding and whitewashing in peer-to-peer systems.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Christos H. Papadimitriou

John Chuang

Ion Stoica

IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., 2006

Implementation with a bounded action space.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Liad Blumrosen

Proceedings of the Proceedings 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2006), 2006

Combinatorial agency.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Proceedings 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2006), 2006

2005

Overcoming free-riding behavior in peer-to-peer systems.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

John Chuang

SIGecom Exch., 2005

The Evolution of Cooperation under Cheap Pseudonyms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

John Chuang

Proceedings of the 7th IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology (CEC 2005), 2005

A price-anticipating resource allocation mechanism for distributed shared clusters.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Kevin Lai

Li Zhang

Proceedings of the Proceedings 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2005), 2005

Hidden-action in multi-hop routing.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Proceedings 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2005), 2005

2004

Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Proceedings 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2004), 2004

2003

Workshop Report for 2nd International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems (IPTPS '03) 21-22 February 2003 - Claremont Hotel, Berkeley, CA, USA.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]