Matheus V. X. Ferreira

According to our database1, Matheus V. X. Ferreira authored at least 13 papers between 2019 and 2024.

Collaborative distances:
  • Dijkstra number2 of four.
  • Erdős number3 of four.

Timeline

Legend:

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PhD thesis 
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Links

On csauthors.net:

Bibliography

2024
Computing Optimal Manipulations in Cryptographic Self-Selection Proof-of-Stake Protocols.
CoRR, 2024

Credible, Optimal Auctions via Public Broadcast.
Proceedings of the 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies, 2024

2023
Credible, Optimal Auctions via Blockchains.
IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch., 2023

Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules.
Proceedings of the 55th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2023

2022
Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake.
Proceedings of the EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Boulder, CO, USA, July 11, 2022

Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for All Distributions.
Proceedings of the 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2022

2021
Economics and Computation in Decentralized Systems
PhD thesis, 2021

Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction Fee Market (Invited Talk).
Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Blockchain Economics, 2021

Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness.
Proceedings of the EC '21: The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021

Dynamic posted-price mechanisms for the blockchain transaction-fee market.
Proceedings of the AFT '21: 3rd ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies, Arlington, Virginia, USA, September 26, 2021

2020
Credible, Truthful, and Bounded-Round Mechanisms via Cryptographic Commitments.
CoRR, 2020

Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments.
Proceedings of the EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020

2019
Selling a Single Item with Negative Externalities.
Proceedings of the World Wide Web Conference, 2019


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