Jason D. Hartline

Daniel W. Linna Jr.

Liren Shan

Alex Tang

Proceedings of the 2022 Symposium on Computer Science and Law, 2022

Classification Protocols with Minimal Disclosure.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Jinshuo Dong

Aravindan Vijayaraghavan

Proceedings of the 2022 Symposium on Computer Science and Law, 2022

2021

SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2022.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., 2021

Full surplus extraction from samples.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Econ. Theory, 2021

Bernoulli Factories and Black-box Reductions in Mechanism Design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. ACM, 2021

Lower Bounds for Prior Independent Algorithms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Aleck C. Johnsen

CoRR, 2021

Revelation gap for pricing from samples.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yiding Feng

Yingkai Li

Proceedings of the STOC '21: 53rd Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2021

Welfare-maximizing Guaranteed Dashboard Mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yuan Deng

Jieming Mao

Proceedings of the EC '21: The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021

Non-Quasi-Linear Agents in Quasi-Linear Mechanisms (Extended Abstract).

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 12th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2021

2020

SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2021.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., 2020

Non-quasi-linear Agents in Quasi-linear Mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2020

Inference from Auction Prices.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2020 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2020

A Truthful Cardinal Mechanism for One-Sided Matching.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2020 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2020

Benchmark Design and Prior-independent Optimization.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Aleck C. Johnsen

Yingkai Li

Proceedings of the 61st IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2020

Mechanisms for a No-Regret Agent: Beyond the Common Prior.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Modibo K. Camara

Aleck C. Johnsen

Proceedings of the 61st IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2020

2019

SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2020.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., 2019

Efficient Computation of Optimal Auctions via Reduced Forms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Math. Oper. Res., 2019

Introduction to the Special Issue - Algorithmic Game Theory - STOC/FOCS/SODA 2012.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., 2019

Optimal crowdsourcing contests.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., 2019

Optimal auctions vs. anonymous pricing.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Saeed Alaei

Rad Niazadeh

Emmanouil Pountourakis

Yang Yuan

Games Econ. Behav., 2019

Sample Complexity for Non-Truthful Mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Samuel Taggart

Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2019

Dashboard Mechanisms for Online Marketplaces.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2019

Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing: Beyond Linear Utility.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yiding Feng

Yingkai Li

Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2019

2018

SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2019.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., 2018

An End-to-End Argument in Mechanism Design (Prior-Independent Auctions for Budgeted Agents).

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yiding Feng

Proceedings of the 59th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2018

2017

SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2018.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., 2017

Mechanism Redesign.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Denis Nekipelov

CoRR, 2017

2016

SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2017.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., 2016

Non-Revelation Mechanism Design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Samuel Taggart

CoRR, 2016

Finding Bidder-Optimal Core Points Quickly.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2016

Bayesian Budget Feasibility with Posted Pricing.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Eric Balkanski

Proceedings of the 25th International Conference on World Wide Web, 2016

A/B Testing of Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Denis Nekipelov

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016

2015

SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2016.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Shaddin Dughmi

SIGecom Exch., 2015

Envy freedom and prior-free mechanism design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Qiqi Yan

J. Econ. Theory, 2015

Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Robert Kleinberg

Azarakhsh Malekian

Games Econ. Behav., 2015

Introduction to the Special Issue - Algorithmic Game Theory - STOC/FOCS/SODA 2011.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., 2015

No-Regret Learning in Repeated Bayesian Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Vasilis Syrgkanis

Éva Tardos

CoRR, 2015

Reverse Mechanism Design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Nima Haghpanah

Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2015

No-Regret Learning in Bayesian Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Vasilis Syrgkanis

Éva Tardos

Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 28: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2015, 2015

2014

Optimal Platform Design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2014

Price of Anarchy for Revenue.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Darrell Hoy

Sam Taggart

CoRR, 2014

Price of anarchy for auction revenue.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Darrell Hoy

Sam Taggart

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2014

Optimal auctions for correlated buyers with sampling.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2014

Mechanism design for data science.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Denis Nekipelov

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2014

2013

Mechanism Design via Consensus Estimates, Cross Checking, and Profit Extraction.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Bach Q. Ha

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2013

Bayesian Mechanism Design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Found. Trends Theor. Comput. Sci., 2013

Prior-independent mechanisms for scheduling.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

David L. Malec

Proceedings of the Symposium on Theory of Computing Conference, 2013

Prior-independent auctions for risk-averse agents.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Hu Fu

Darrell Hoy

Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2013

Prior-free auctions for budgeted agents.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Bach Q. Ha

Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2013

Auctions with unique equilibria.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2013

The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 54th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2013

2012

The Biased Sampling Profit Extraction Auction

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Bach Q. Ha

CoRR, 2012

The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2012

Bayesian optimal auctions via multi- to single-agent reduction.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2012

2011

Derandomization of auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., 2011

Prior-Independent Multi-parameter Mechanism Design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics - 7th International Workshop, 2011

Envy, truth, and profit.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Qiqi Yan

Proceedings of the Proceedings 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2011), 2011

2010

Algorithms for Data Migration.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Algorithmica, 2010

Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Brendan Lucier

Proceedings of the 42nd ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2010

Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

David L. Malec

Proceedings of the 42nd ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2010

Approximation in mechanism design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory, 2010

2009

Simple versus optimal mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., 2009

Sequential Posted Pricing and Multi-parameter Mechanism Design

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

David L. Malec

CoRR, 2009

Limited and online supply and the bayesian foundations of prior-free mechanism design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Proceedings 10th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2009), 2009

Selling ad campaigns: online algorithms with cancellations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Moshe Babaioff

Robert D. Kleinberg

Proceedings of the Proceedings 10th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2009), 2009

2008

Reducing mechanism design to algorithm design via machine learning.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Comput. Syst. Sci., 2008

Optimal Mechansim Design and Money Burning

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2008

Optimal marketing strategies over social networks.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Vahab S. Mirrokni

Mukund Sundararajan

Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on World Wide Web, 2008

Optimal mechanism design and money burning.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 40th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2008

Auctions for structured procurement.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Nineteenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2008

2007

Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Robert D. Kleinberg

Proceedings of the Proceedings 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2007), 2007

2006

Competitive auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., 2006

Bayesian Optimal No-Deficit Mechanism Design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics, Second International Workshop, 2006

Knapsack auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Gagan Aggarwal

Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2006

2005

Characterizing History Independent Data Structures.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Algorithmica, 2005

On the Competitive Ratio of the Random Sampling Auction.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics, First International Workshop, 2005

Near-Optimal Pricing in Near-Linear Time.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Vladlen Koltun

Proceedings of the Algorithms and Data Structures, 9th International Workshop, 2005

On profit-maximizing envy-free pricing.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2005

Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2005

Near-optimal online auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Avrim Blum

Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2005

From optimal limited to unlimited supply auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Robert McGrew

Proceedings of the Proceedings 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2005), 2005

Mechanism Design via Machine Learning.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2005), 2005

2004

A Lower Bound on the Competitive Ratio of Truthful Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the STACS 2004, 2004

2003

Competitiveness via consensus.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2003

Envy-free auctions for digital goods.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Proceedings 4th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2003), 2003

2002

Competitive generalized auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Proceedings on 34th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2002

Truthful and Competitive Double Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Algorithms, 2002

2001

An Experimental Study of Data Migration Algorithms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Algorithm Engineering, 2001

On algorithms for efficient data migration.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2001

Competitive auctions and digital goods.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Andrew Wright

Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2001

Competitive Auctions for Multiple Digital Goods.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]