Inbal Talgam-Cohen

CoRR, 2024

Strategy-Proof Auctions through Conformal Prediction.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Roy Maor Lotan

Yaniv Romano

CoRR, 2024

MAC Advice for Facility Location Mechanism Design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Zohar Barak

Anupam Gupta

Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis

CoRR, 2024

Contracting with a Learning Agent.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Joshua R. Wang

S. Matthew Weinberg

CoRR, 2024

2023

Algorithmic Cheap Talk.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2023

Deep Contract Design via Discontinuous Piecewise Affine Neural Networks.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2023

Interdependent Public Projects.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2023 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2023

Universally Robust Information Aggregation for Binary Decisions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

Bayesian Analysis of Linear Contracts.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

Delegated Classification.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Eden Saig

Nir Rosenfeld

Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 36: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2023, 2023

Deep Contract Design via Discontinuous Networks.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 36: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2023, 2023

2022

Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., 2022

Information Design in the Principal-Agent Problem.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2022

Distributional Robustness: From Pricing to Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Nir Bachrach

Proceedings of the EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Boulder, CO, USA, July 11, 2022

Multi-Channel Bayesian Persuasion.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2022

Strategic Representation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the International Conference on Machine Learning, 2022

2021

The Complexity of Contracts.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIAM J. Comput., 2021

Competitive Equilibrium with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Math. Oper. Res., 2021

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Oper. Res., 2021

Unified Fair Allocation of Goods and Chores via Copies.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2021

Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the EC '21: The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021

Contracts with Private Cost per Unit-of-Effort.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Tal Alon

Proceedings of the EC '21: The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021

Auctions with Interdependence and SOS: Improved Approximation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ameer Amer

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 14th International Symposium, 2021

Strategic Classification in the Dark.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 38th International Conference on Machine Learning, 2021

PoA of Simple Auctions with Interdependent Values.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

Bayesian Persuasion under Ex Ante and Ex Post Constraints.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yakov Babichenko

Konstantin Zabarnyi

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

2020

Editors' introduction.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

S. Matthew Weinberg

SIGecom Exch., 2020

Approximate Modularity Revisited.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Michal Feldman

SIAM J. Comput., 2020

Robust Auctions for Revenue via Enhanced Competition.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Qiqi Yan

Oper. Res., 2020

Price of Anarchy of Simple Auctions with Interdependent Values.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2020

Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Michal Feldman

Yannai A. Gonczarowski

Brendan Lucier

Proceedings of the EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020

Multiagent Evaluation Mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2020

Prior-Independent Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Beyond the Worst-Case Analysis of Algorithms, 2020

2019

Competitive Equilibrium with Generic Budgets: Beyond Additive.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2019

Settling the Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Two Subadditive Buyers.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 60th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2019

Fair Allocation through Competitive Equilibrium from Generic Incomes.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, 2019

Simple versus Optimal Contracts.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2019

2018

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2018

Complement-Free Couples Must Communicate: A Hardness Result for Two-Player Combinatorial Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2018

2017

Modularity and greed in double auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., 2017

Competitive Equilibria with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2017

Why prices need algorithms (invited talk).

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 49th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2017

The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements: Abstract.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

When Are Welfare Guarantees Robust?.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Jan Vondrák

Proceedings of the Approximation, 2017

2016

Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2016

Prediction and Welfare in Ad Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Mukund Sundararajan

Theory Comput. Syst., 2016

Oblivious Rounding and the Integrality Gap.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Michal Feldman

Proceedings of the Approximation, 2016

2015

Robust market design: information and computation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

PhD thesis, 2015

Why prices need algorithms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., 2015

Crossing boundaries.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

XRDS, 2015

Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 11th International Conference, 2015

2014

Vertex Sparsifiers: New Results from Old Techniques.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIAM J. Comput., 2014

Do no evil in research.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Sean Follmer

XRDS, 2014

Enriching your network via diversity.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

XRDS, 2014

A shrimp's tale: why we need to fund research.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Sean Follmer

XRDS, 2014

Towards a critical debate about technology and its impact.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Sean Follmer

XRDS, 2014

2013

Money and power in academic publishing.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

XRDS, 2013

Equip Yourself for Creativity.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

XRDS, 2013

'Information wants to be free'.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

XRDS, 2013

Refine Predictions Ad Infinitum?

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Mukund Sundararajan

CoRR, 2013

Optimal and near-optimal mechanism design with interdependent values.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2013

2012

Are you a good match for XRDS?.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

XRDS, 2012

Announcing the XRDS blog.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

XRDS, 2012

XRDS reloaded.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

XRDS, 2012

Supply-limiting mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Qiqi Yan

Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2012

Ad auctions with data.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2012 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM Workshops, 2012

2010

Human computation and crowdsourcing.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Michael S. Bernstein

XRDS, 2010

A Direct Reduction from k-Player to 2-Player Approximate Nash Equilibrium

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2010

A Direct Reduction from k-Player to 2-Player Approximate Nash Equilibrium.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]