Gökçe Dayanikli

According to our database, Gökçe Dayanikli authored at least 11 papers between 2021 and 2024.

Collaborative distances:

• Dijkstra number of five.
• Erdős number of four.

2024

How can the tragedy of the commons be prevented?: Introducing Linear Quadratic Mixed Mean Field Games.

Gökçe Dayanikli, Mathieu Laurière

Proceedings of the 63rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, 2024

Deep Learning for Population-Dependent Controls in Mean Field Control Problems with Common Noise.

Gökçe Dayanikli, Mathieu Laurière, Jiacheng Zhang

Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2024

Multi-population Mean Field Games with Multiple Major Players: Application to Carbon Emission Regulations.

Gökçe Dayanikli, Mathieu Laurière

Proceedings of the American Control Conference, 2024

Learning Discrete-Time Major-Minor Mean Field Games.

Kai Cui, Gökçe Dayanikli, Mathieu Laurière, Matthieu Geist, Olivier Pietquin, Heinz Koeppl

Proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2024

2023

From Nash Equilibrium to Social Optimum and vice versa: a Mean Field Perspective.

René A. Carmona, Gökçe Dayanikli, François Delarue, Mathieu Laurière

CoRR, 2023

Enhancing Pandemic Preparedness Using Mean Field and Simulation Modeling.

Mohammad Dehghanimohammadabadai, Gökçe Dayanikli

Proceedings of the Winter Simulation Conference, 2023

2022

Optimal Incentives to Mitigate Epidemics: A Stackelberg Mean Field Game Approach.

Alexander Aurell, René Carmona, Gökçe Dayanikli, Mathieu Laurière

SIAM J. Control. Optim., 2022

Mean Field Models to Regulate Carbon Emissions in Electricity Production.

René Carmona, Gökçe Dayanikli, Mathieu Laurière

Dyn. Games Appl., 2022

Finite State Graphon Games with Applications to Epidemics.

Alexander Aurell, René Carmona, Gökçe Dayanikli, Mathieu Laurière

Dyn. Games Appl., 2022

Mean Field Model for an Advertising Competition in a Duopoly.

René Carmona, Gökçe Dayanikli

CoRR, 2022

2021

Mean Field Game Model for an Advertising Competition in a Duopoly.

René Carmona, Gökçe Dayanikli

IGTR, 2021