Françoise Forges

Orcid: 0000-0001-6777-7066

According to our database1, Françoise Forges authored at least 20 papers between 1988 and 2022.

Collaborative distances:
  • Dijkstra number2 of four.
  • Erdős number3 of four.

Timeline

Legend:

Book 
In proceedings 
Article 
PhD thesis 
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Links

On csauthors.net:

Bibliography

2022
Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm.
Int. J. Game Theory, 2022

Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: The single-crossing case.
Games Econ. Behav., 2022

2021
Strategic information transmission with sender's approval.
Int. J. Game Theory, 2021

2017
Introduction to the John Forbes Nash Jr. Memorial Special Issue.
Games Econ. Behav., 2017

2016
Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games.
Int. J. Game Theory, 2016

2015
Bayesian repeated games and reputation.
J. Econ. Theory, 2015

2014
Corrigendum to "Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations" [J. Econ. Theory 75 (1997) 388-406].
J. Econ. Theory, 2014

2013
Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information: some Open Problems.
IGTR, 2013

A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment.
Games Econ. Behav., 2013

2011
Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values.
Games Econ. Behav., 2011

2009
Correlated Equilibria and Communication in Games.
Proceedings of the Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science, 2009

Afriat's theorem for general budget sets.
J. Econ. Theory, 2009

2008
Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium: Definition and Computational Complexity.
Math. Oper. Res., 2008

Long persuasion games.
J. Econ. Theory, 2008

Multistage Communication with and without Verifiable Types.
IGTR, 2008

2006
Feasible Mechanisms in Economies with Type-Dependent Endowments.
Soc. Choice Welf., 2006

2004
The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignment game.
Math. Soc. Sci., 2004

2001
A Note on the Incentive Compatible Core.
J. Econ. Theory, 2001

1994
Non-Zero Sum Repeated Games and Information Transmission.
Proceedings of the Essays in Game Theory, In Honor of Michael Maschler, 1994

1988
Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information.
Math. Oper. Res., 1988


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