Erel Segal-Halevi

Orcid: 0000-0002-7497-5834

Affiliations:
  • Ariel University, Israel


According to our database1, Erel Segal-Halevi authored at least 93 papers between 2012 and 2024.

Collaborative distances:
  • Dijkstra number2 of four.
  • Erdős number3 of two.

Timeline

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Bibliography

2024
Weighted Fairness Notions for Indivisible Items Revisited.
ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., September, 2024

Reducing Leximin Fairness to Utilitarian Optimization.
CoRR, 2024

Optimal Budget Aggregation with Single-Peaked Preferences.
Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2024

Fair Division with Bounded Sharing: Binary and Non-degenerate Valuations.
Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 17th International Symposium, 2024

k-Times Bin Packing and its Application to Fair Electricity Distribution.
Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 17th International Symposium, 2024

Partitioning Problems with Splittings and Interval Targets.
Proceedings of the 35th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation, 2024

On Connected Strongly-Proportional Cake-Cutting.
Proceedings of the ECAI 2024 - 27th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 19-24 October 2024, Santiago de Compostela, Spain, 2024

2023
Ascending-price mechanism for general multi-sided markets.
Artif. Intell., December, 2023

Fairness for multi-self agents.
Games Econ. Behav., September, 2023

On maximum bipartite matching with separation.
Inf. Process. Lett., August, 2023

Keep your distance: Land division with separation.
Comput. Geom., August, 2023

Computing welfare-Maximizing fair allocations of indivisible goods.
Eur. J. Oper. Res., June, 2023

Cutting a Cake Fairly for Groups Revisited.
Am. Math. Mon., March, 2023

On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints.
J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2023

On Connected Strongly-Proportional Cake-Cutting.
CoRR, 2023

k-times bin packing and its application to fair electricity distribution.
CoRR, 2023

Computing approximate roots of monotone functions.
CoRR, 2023

Efficient Almost-Egalitarian Allocation of Goods and Bads.
CoRR, 2023

A Reduction from Chores Allocation to Job Scheduling.
Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

Balanced Donor Coordination.
Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Goods (Extended Abstract).
Proceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2023

Leximin Approximation: From Single-Objective to Multi-Objective.
Proceedings of the ECAI 2023 - 26th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, September 30 - October 4, 2023, Kraków, Poland, 2023

Efficient Nearly-Fair Division with Capacity Constraints.
Proceedings of the 2023 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2023

2022
Fractionally Balanced Hypergraphs and Rainbow KKM Theorems.
Comb., December, 2022

Generalized Rental Harmony.
Am. Math. Mon., 2022

Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting.
Soc. Choice Welf., 2022

One person, one weight: when is weighted voting democratic?
Soc. Choice Welf., 2022

Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Goods.
J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2022

Envy-free matchings in bipartite graphs and their applications to fair division.
Inf. Sci., 2022

Efficient Fair Division with Minimal Sharing.
Oper. Res., 2022

Fair cake-cutting in practice.
Games Econ. Behav., 2022

Fair Division Algorithms for Electricity Distribution.
CoRR, 2022

Partitioning Problems with Splitting and Interval Targets.
CoRR, 2022

Mind the gap: Cake cutting with separation.
Artif. Intell., 2022

Redividing the cake.
Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2022

Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Chores.
Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2022

How to Charge Lightning: The Economics of Bitcoin Transaction Channels.
Proceedings of the 58th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, 2022

2021
How to Cut a Cake Fairly: A Generalization to Groups.
Am. Math. Mon., 2021

Fair multi-cake cutting.
Discret. Appl. Math., 2021

On Monotonicity of Number-Partitioning Algorithms.
CoRR, 2021

Strongly budget balanced auctions for multi-sided markets.
Artif. Intell., 2021

Fair cake-cutting algorithms with real land-value data.
Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2021

Graphical Cake Cutting via Maximin Share.
Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

A Global Multi-Sided Market with Ascending-Price Mechanism.
Proceedings of the AAMAS '21: 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2021

2020
Envy-Free Division of Land.
Math. Oper. Res., 2020

Fair Allocation with Diminishing Differences.
J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2020

Computing Fair Utilitarian Allocations of Indivisible Goods.
CoRR, 2020

Obtaining costly unverifiable valuations from a single agent.
Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2020

Competitive equilibrium for almost all incomes: existence and fairness.
Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2020

Strongly Budget Balanced Auctions for Multi-Sided Markets.
Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2020

2019
Fair cake-cutting among families.
Soc. Choice Welf., 2019

Quasilinear Rental Harmony.
CoRR, 2019

The Maximin Share Dominance Relation.
CoRR, 2019

Fair Division with Bounded Sharing.
CoRR, 2019

Fair Division with Minimal Sharing.
CoRR, 2019

The Constrained Round Robin Algorithm for Fair and Efficient Allocation.
CoRR, 2019

Bipartite Envy-Free Matching.
CoRR, 2019

Democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods.
Artif. Intell., 2019

Obtaining Costly Unverifiable Valuations from a Single Agent.
Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, 2019

2018
Counting Blanks in Polygonal Arrangements.
SIAM J. Discret. Math., 2018

Flexible level-1 consensus ensuring stable social choice: analysis and algorithms.
Soc. Choice Welf., 2018

Resource-monotonicity and population-monotonicity in connected cake-cutting.
Math. Soc. Sci., 2018

Making an Appraiser Work for You.
CoRR, 2018

Cake-Cutting with Different Entitlements: How Many Cuts are Needed?
CoRR, 2018

Double Auctions in Markets for Multiple Kinds of Goods.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018

Fairly Dividing a Cake after Some Parts Were Burnt in the Oven.
Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, 2018

Competitive Equilibrium For almost All Incomes.
Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, 2018

Eliciting Truthful Unverifiable Information.
Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, 2018

MUDA: A Truthful Multi-Unit Double-Auction Mechanism.
Proceedings of the Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018

2017
How to Charge Lightning.
CoRR, 2017

Truthful Bilateral Trade is Impossible even with Fixed Prices.
CoRR, 2017

On Democratic Fairness for Groups of Agents.
CoRR, 2017

Competitive Equilibria with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets: Settling the Open Cases.
CoRR, 2017

Cutting a Cake with both Good and Bad Parts.
CoRR, 2017

On Level-1 Consensus Ensuring Stable Social Choice.
CoRR, 2017

Fair Allocation based on Diminishing Differences.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017

2016
Waste Makes Haste: Bounded Time Algorithms for Envy-Free Cake Cutting with Free Disposal.
ACM Trans. Algorithms, 2016

Demand-flow of agents with gross-substitute valuations.
Oper. Res. Lett., 2016

Envy-Free Cake-Cutting in Two Dimensions.
CoRR, 2016

A Random-Sampling Double-Auction Mechanism.
CoRR, 2016

Cutting a Cake without Harming the Toppings.
CoRR, 2016

How to Re-Divide a Cake Fairly.
CoRR, 2016

NegoChat-A: a chat-based negotiation agent with bounded rationality.
Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2016

SBBA: A Strongly-Budget-Balanced Double-Auction Mechanism.
Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 9th International Symposium, 2016

2015
First Steps in Chat-Based Negotiating Agents.
Proceedings of the Next Frontier in Agent-Based Complex Automated Negotiation, 2015

Resource-monotonicity and Population-monotonicity in Cake-cutting.
CoRR, 2015

Fair and Square: Cake-Cutting in Two Dimensions.
CoRR, 2015

Fair Cake-Cutting among Groups.
CoRR, 2015

Waste Makes Haste: Bounded Time Protocols for Envy-Free Cake Cutting with Free Disposal.
Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2015

Envy-Free Cake-Cutting in Two Dimensions.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015

2014
NegoChat: a chat-based negotiation agent.
Proceedings of the International conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 2014

2013
PLIS: a Probabilistic Lexical Inference System.
Proceedings of the 51st Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics, 2013

2012
Using Textual Entailment with Variables for KBP Slot Filling Task.
Proceedings of the Fifth Text Analysis Conference, 2012


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