Clayton Thomas

Orcid: 0000-0003-0337-0560

According to our database1, Clayton Thomas authored at least 17 papers between 2017 and 2024.

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Timeline

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Links

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Bibliography

2024
Priority-Neutral Matching Lattices Are Not Distributive.
CoRR, 2024

Structural Complexities of Matching Mechanisms.
Proceedings of the 56th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2024

Describing Deferred Acceptance and Strategyproofness to Participants: Experimental Analysis.
Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2024

Revisiting the Primitives of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design.
Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2024

Communication Separations for Truthful Auctions: Breaking the Two-Player Barrier.
Proceedings of the 65th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2024

2023
Explainable Mechanism Design
PhD thesis, 2023

Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism Descriptions.
Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

2022
On the Complexities of Understanding Matching Mechanisms.
CoRR, 2022

The Short-Side Advantage in Random Matching Markets.
Proceedings of the 5th Symposium on Simplicity in Algorithms, 2022

2021
Exponential communication separations between notions of selfishness.
Proceedings of the STOC '21: 53rd Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2021

Classification of Priorities Such That Deferred Acceptance is OSP Implementable.
Proceedings of the EC '21: The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021

Tiered Random Matching Markets: Rank Is Proportional to Popularity.
Proceedings of the 12th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2021

2020
Classification of Priorities Such That Deferred Acceptance is Obviously Strategyproof.
CoRR, 2020

Tiered Random Matching Markets: Rank is Proportional to Popularity.
CoRR, 2020

Implementation in Advised Strategies: Welfare Guarantees from Posted-Price Mechanisms When Demand Queries Are NP-Hard.
Proceedings of the 11th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2020

2019
Representing All Stable Matchings by Walking a Maximal Chain.
CoRR, 2019

2017
Maximally recoverable codes: The bounded case.
Proceedings of the 55th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, 2017


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