Christos-Alexandros Psomas

Orcid: 0000-0002-7709-5058

Affiliations:
  • Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA


According to our database1, Christos-Alexandros Psomas authored at least 53 papers between 2011 and 2024.

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Bibliography

2024
Technical Note - On Hiring Secretaries with Stochastic Departures.
Oper. Res., 2024

Fair and Efficient Online Allocations.
Oper. Res., 2024

Mechanism Design with Delegated Bidding.
CoRR, 2024

V3rified: Revelation vs Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Decentralized Verifiable Computation.
CoRR, 2024

Mechanism Design via the Interim Relaxation.
CoRR, 2024

Automating Food Drop: The Power of Two Choices for Dynamic and Fair Food Allocation.
CoRR, 2024

On the Fairness of Normalized p-Means for Allocating Goods and Chores.
CoRR, 2024

More is Merrier: Relax the Non-Collusion Assumption in Multi-Server PIR.
Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2024

Getting More by Knowing Less: Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Fair Division.
Proceedings of the Thirty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2024

2023
Fairly Allocating Goods in Parallel.
CoRR, 2023

On the Existence of Envy-Free Allocations Beyond Additive Valuations.
CoRR, 2023

Reward Selection with Noisy Observations.
CoRR, 2023

Smoothed Analysis of Social Choice Revisited.
Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 19th International Conference, 2023

On the Robustness of Mechanism Design under Total Variation Distance.
Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 36: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2023, 2023

Refined Mechanism Design for Approximately Structured Priors via Active Regression.
Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 36: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2023, 2023

Collusion-Deterrent Threshold Information Escrow.
Proceedings of the 36th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, 2023

2022
Risk-Robust Mechanism Design for a Prospect-Theoretic Buyer.
Theory Comput. Syst., 2022

Dynamic Fair Resource Division.
Math. Oper. Res., 2022

On the complexity of dynamic mechanism design.
Games Econ. Behav., 2022

Relax the Non-Collusion Assumption for Multi-Server PIR.
CoRR, 2022

On Infinite Separations Between Simple and Optimal Mechanisms.
Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 35: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2022, 2022

Dynamic Fair Division with Partial Information.
Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 35: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2022, 2022

Simple Mechanisms for Welfare Maximization in Rich Advertising Auctions.
Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 35: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2022, 2022

Fair and Efficient Allocations Without Obvious Manipulations.
Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 35: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2022, 2022

Leakage Inversion: Towards Quantifying Privacy in Searchable Encryption.
Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2022

Beyond Cake Cutting: Allocating Homogeneous Divisible Goods.
Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2022

2021
Algorithmic Persuasion with Evidence.
Proceedings of the 12th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2021

Fair and Efficient Online Allocations with Normalized Valuations.
Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

2020
Optimal multi-unit mechanisms with private demands.
Games Econ. Behav., 2020

Fair Division with Binary Valuations: One Rule to Rule Them All.
Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 16th International Conference, 2020

Fairness-Efficiency Tradeoffs in Dynamic Fair Division.
Proceedings of the EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020

Explainable Voting.
Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 33: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2020, 2020

Hitting the High Notes: Subset Selection for Maximizing Expected Order Statistics.
Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 33: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2020, 2020

2019
WeBuildAI: Participatory Framework for Algorithmic Governance.
Proc. ACM Hum. Comput. Interact., 2019

Reductions in PPP.
Inf. Process. Lett., 2019

How to Hire Secretaries with Stochastic Departures.
Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 15th International Conference, 2019

Persuasion and Incentives Through the Lens of Duality.
Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 15th International Conference, 2019

Achieving a Fairer Future by Changing the Past.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

Statistical Foundations of Virtual Democracy.
Proceedings of the 36th International Conference on Machine Learning, 2019

Smoothed Analysis of Multi-Item Auctions with Correlated Values.
Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2019

Formal Barriers to Longest-Chain Proof-of-Stake Protocols.
Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2019

Fair and Efficient Memory Sharing: Confronting Free Riders.
Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

2018
On the Competition Complexity of Dynamic Mechanism Design.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2018

How to Make Envy Vanish Over Time.
Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018

An Improved Envy-Free Cake Cutting Protocol for Four Agents.
Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 11th International Symposium, 2018

2017
Algorithmic Mechanism Design in Dynamic Environments.
PhD thesis, 2017

Controlled Dynamic Fair Division.
Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

2016
The sample complexity of auctions with side information.
Proceedings of the 48th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2016

2015
Dynamic Fair Division with Minimal Disruptions.
Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2015

2014
The Intractability of Dynamic Mechanism Design.
CoRR, 2014

Strategyproof allocation of discrete jobs on multiple machines.
Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2014

2012
Probabilistic Extension of Allen's Relations Using the Hourglass Model.
Proceedings of the IEEE 24th International Conference on Tools with Artificial Intelligence, 2012

2011
On Worst-Case Allocations in the Presence of Indivisible Goods.
Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics - 7th International Workshop, 2011


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