Bo Li

Math. Program., January, 2024

Eliciting truthful reports with partial signals in repeated games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Emmanouil Pountourakis

Theor. Comput. Sci., 2024

A Complete Landscape of EFX Allocations of Mixed Manna on Graphs.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2024

RLeXplore: Accelerating Research in Intrinsically-Motivated Reinforcement Learning.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Mingqi Yuan

Roger Creus Castanyer

CoRR, 2024

Almost proportional allocations of indivisible chores: Computation, approximation and efficiency.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Artif. Intell., 2024

Fair Surveillance Assignment Problem.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the ACM on Web Conference 2024, 2024

Public Event Scheduling with Busy Agents.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2024

A Complete Landscape of EFX Allocations on Graphs: Goods, Chores and Mixed Manna.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2024

Improved Approximation of Weighted MMS Fairness for Indivisible Chores.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Pinyan Lu

Proceedings of the Thirty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2024

Allocating Contiguous Blocks of Indivisible Chores Fairly: Revisited.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2024

Fair and Efficient Division of a Discrete Cake with Switching Utility Loss.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2024

Bounding the Incentive Ratio of the Probabilistic Serial Rule.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Shiji Xing

Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2024

Envy-Free House Allocation under Uncertain Preferences.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2024

2023

Well-behaved online load balancing against strategic jobs.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Sched., October, 2023

Fair division of indivisible goods: Recent progress and open questions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Alexandros A. Voudouris

Artif. Intell., September, 2023

Your College Dorm and Dormmates: Fair Resource Sharing with Externalities.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2023

RLLTE: Long-Term Evolution Project of Reinforcement Learning.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2023

On Hill's Worst-Case Guarantee for Indivisible Bads.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2023

Fair Allocation of Indivisible Chores: Beyond Additive Costs.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yu Zhou

Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 36: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2023, 2023

Maximin-Aware Allocations of Indivisible Chores with Symmetric and Asymmetric Agents.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Tianze Wei

Proceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2023

Automatic Intrinsic Reward Shaping for Exploration in Deep Reinforcement Learning.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the International Conference on Machine Learning, 2023

On the Price of Fairness in the Connected Discrete Cake Cutting Problem.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the ECAI 2023 - 26th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, September 30 - October 4, 2023, Kraków, Poland, 2023

GrowSP: Unsupervised Semantic Segmentation of 3D Point Clouds.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2023

Approximation Algorithm for Computing Budget-Feasible EF1 Allocations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2023 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2023

Possible Fairness for Allocating Indivisible Resources.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2023 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2023

Proportional Fairness in Obnoxious Facility Location.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2023 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2023

Multiagent MST Cover: Pleasing All Optimally via a Simple Voting Rule.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2023

2022

Algorithmic fair allocation of indivisible items: a survey and new questions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., July, 2022

A note on the online interval scheduling secretary problem.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Chenhao Wang

Ruilong Zhang

Oper. Res. Lett., 2022

Discouraging pool block withholding attacks in Bitcoin.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Comb. Optim., 2022

Fair Graphical Resource Allocation with Matching-Induced Utilities.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2022

Tackling Visual Control via Multi-View Exploration Maximization.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2022

Rewarding Episodic Visitation Discrepancy for Exploration in Reinforcement Learning.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2022

Fair Division of Indivisible Goods: A Survey.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Alexandros A. Voudouris

CoRR, 2022

On the Price of Fairness of Allocating Contiguous Blocks.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2022

Fair Allocation of Indivisible Chores: Beyond Additive Valuations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yu Zhou

CoRR, 2022

Query Efficient Prophet Inequality with Unknown I.I.D. Distributions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yutong Wu

CoRR, 2022

Bayesian auctions with efficient queries.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Artif. Intell., 2022

Almost (Weighted) Proportional Allocations for Indivisible Chores✱✱.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the WWW '22: The ACM Web Conference 2022, Virtual Event, Lyon, France, April 25, 2022

Bayesian Auctions with Efficient Queries (Extended Abstract).

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022

2021

Two-facility Location Games with Minimum Distance Requirement.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2021

Eliciting Information with Partial Signals in Repeated Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Emmanouil Pountourakis

CoRR, 2021

Fair Allocation with Interval Scheduling Constraints.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ruilong Zhang

CoRR, 2021

Approximately Envy-Free Budget-Feasible Allocation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2021

Almost Proportional Allocations for Indivisible Chores.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2021

Maximal Information Propagation via Lotteries.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 17th International Conference, 2021

Fair Scheduling for Time-dependent Resources.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ruilong Zhang

Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 34: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2021, 2021

Mechanism Design for Facility Location Problems: A Survey.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

Budget-feasible Maximum Nash Social Welfare is Almost Envy-free.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

Approximate Group Fairness for Clustering.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 38th International Conference on Machine Learning, 2021

Pool Block Withholding Attack with Rational Miners.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ni Yang

Chenhao Wang

Proceedings of the Frontiers of Algorithmics - International Joint Conference, 2021

Multi-Robot Task Allocation-Complexity and Approximation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the AAMAS '21: 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2021

2020

Fair Resource Sharing with Externailities.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2020

Budget-feasible Maximum Nash Social Welfare Allocation is Almost Envy-free.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2020

Discouraging Pool Block Withholding Attacks in Bitcoins.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2020

Fair Resource Sharing and Dorm Assignment.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2020

Facility Location Problem with Capacity Constraints: Algorithmic and Mechanism Design Perspectives.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2020

2019

Efficient Approximations for the Online Dispersion Problem.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIAM J. Comput., 2019

Maximin-Aware Allocations of Indivisible Goods.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

Weighted Maxmin Fair Share Allocation of Indivisible Chores.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Hau Chan

Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

Strategyproof and Approximately Maxmin Fair Share Allocation of Chores.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

Approximately Maximizing the Broker's Profit in a Two-sided Market.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

Mechanism Design with Unstructured Beliefs.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, 2019

Heterogeneous Two-facility Location Games with Minimum Distance Requirement.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, 2019

Maxmin Share Fair Allocation of Indivisible Chores to Asymmetric Agents.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Hau Chan

Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, 2019

2018

Path cooperative games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Comb. Optim., 2018

Dynamic Fair Division Problem with General Valuations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2018

Information Elicitation for Bayesian Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 11th International Symposium, 2018

Dynamic Fair Division Problem with General Valuations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Wenyang Li

Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018

Brief Announcement: Bayesian Auctions with Efficient Queries.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, 2018

2017

From Bayesian to Crowdsourced Bayesian Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]