Alberto Marchesi

Orcid: 0000-0002-8284-5757

Affiliations:
  • Polytechnic University of Milan, Italy (PhD 2020)


According to our database1, Alberto Marchesi authored at least 61 papers between 2017 and 2024.

Collaborative distances:
  • Dijkstra number2 of four.
  • Erdős number3 of four.

Timeline

Legend:

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Bibliography

2024
Learning Constrained Markov Decision Processes With Non-stationary Rewards and Constraints.
CoRR, 2024

The Sample Complexity of Stackelberg Games.
CoRR, 2024

Learning Adversarial MDPs with Stochastic Hard Constraints.
CoRR, 2024

Regret-Minimizing Contracts: Agency Under Uncertainty.
CoRR, 2024

Markov Persuasion Processes: Learning to Persuade from Scratch.
CoRR, 2024

Online Learning in CMDPs: Handling Stochastic and Adversarial Constraints.
Proceedings of the Forty-first International Conference on Machine Learning, 2024

Learning Optimal Contracts: How to Exploit Small Action Spaces.
Proceedings of the Twelfth International Conference on Learning Representations, 2024

Finding Effective Ad Allocations: How to Exploit User History.
Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2024

Learning Extensive-Form Perfect Equilibria in Two-Player Zero-Sum Sequential Games.
Proceedings of the International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics, 2024

2023
Increasing revenue in Bayesian posted price auctions through signaling.
Artif. Intell., October, 2023

Designing menus of contracts efficiently: The power of randomization.
Artif. Intell., May, 2023

A Best-of-Both-Worlds Algorithm for Constrained MDPs with Long-Term Constraints.
CoRR, 2023

Selling Information while Being an Interested Party.
CoRR, 2023

Multi-Agent Contract Design: How to Commission Multiple Agents with Individual Outcome.
CoRR, 2023

Regret minimization in online Bayesian persuasion: Handling adversarial receiver's types under full and partial feedback models.
Artif. Intell., 2023

Multi-Agent Contract Design: How to Commission Multiple Agents with Individual Outcomes.
Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

Persuading Farsighted Receivers in MDPs: the Power of Honesty.
Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 36: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2023, 2023

Constrained Phi-Equilibria.
Proceedings of the International Conference on Machine Learning, 2023

Optimal Rates and Efficient Algorithms for Online Bayesian Persuasion.
Proceedings of the International Conference on Machine Learning, 2023

2022
Simple Uncoupled No-regret Learning Dynamics for Extensive-form Correlated Equilibrium.
J. ACM, 2022

Last-iterate Convergence to Trembling-hand Perfect Equilibria.
CoRR, 2022

Bayesian agency: Linear versus tractable contracts.
Artif. Intell., 2022

A Unifying Framework for Online Optimization with Long-Term Constraints.
Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 35: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2022, 2022

Sequential Information Design: Learning to Persuade in the Dark.
Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 35: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2022, 2022

The Power of Media Agencies in Ad Auctions: Improving Utility through Coordinated Bidding.
Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022

Public Signaling in Bayesian Ad Auctions.
Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022

Safe Learning in Tree-Form Sequential Decision Making: Handling Hard and Soft Constraints.
Proceedings of the International Conference on Machine Learning, 2022

Bayesian Persuasion Meets Mechanism Design: Going Beyond Intractability with Type Reporting.
Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2022

Signaling in Posted Price Auctions.
Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022

Efficiency of Ad Auctions with Price Displaying.
Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022

2021
Committing to correlated strategies with multiple leaders.
Artif. Intell., 2021

Exploiting Opponents Under Utility Constraints in Sequential Games.
Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 34: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2021, 2021

Decentralized No-regret Learning Algorithms for Extensive-form Correlated Equilibria (Extended Abstract).
Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

Multi-Receiver Online Bayesian Persuasion.
Proceedings of the 38th International Conference on Machine Learning, 2021

Online Posted Pricing with Unknown Time-Discounted Valuations.
Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

Trembling-Hand Perfection and Correlation in Sequential Games.
Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

Signaling in Bayesian Network Congestion Games: the Subtle Power of Symmetry.
Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

2020
Leadership games: multiple followers, multiple leaders, and perfection.
PhD thesis, 2020

A characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria.
Games Econ. Behav., 2020

Bilevel programming methods for computing single-leader-multi-follower equilibria in normal-form and polymatrix games.
EURO J. Comput. Optim., 2020

No-regret learning dynamics for extensive-form correlated and coarse correlated equilibria.
CoRR, 2020

Computing a Pessimistic Stackelberg Equilibrium with Multiple Followers: The Mixed-Pure Case.
Algorithmica, 2020

No-Regret Learning Dynamics for Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium.
Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 33: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2020, 2020

Online Bayesian Persuasion.
Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 33: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2020, 2020

Learning Probably Approximately Correct Maximin Strategies in Simulation-Based Games with Infinite Strategy Spaces.
Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2020

2019
Leadership in Congestion Games: Multiple User Classes and Non-Singleton Actions (Extended Version).
CoRR, 2019

Be a Leader or Become a Follower: The Strategy to Commit to with Multiple Leaders (Extended Version).
CoRR, 2019

Leadership in singleton congestion games: What is hard and what is easy.
Artif. Intell., 2019

Learning to Correlate in Multi-Player General-Sum Sequential Games.
Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 32: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2019, 2019

Leadership in Congestion Games: Multiple User Classes and Non-Singleton Actions.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

Be a Leader or Become a Follower: The Strategy to Commit to with Multiple Leaders.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

Quasi-Perfect Stackelberg Equilibrium.
Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

2018
Learning dynamics in limited-control repeated games.
Intelligenza Artificiale, 2018

Computing a Pessimistic Leader-Follower Equilibrium with Multiple Followers: the Mixed-Pure Case.
CoRR, 2018

Computing the Strategy to Commit to in Polymatrix Games (Extended Version).
CoRR, 2018

Leadership in Singleton Congestion Games.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018

Trembling-Hand Perfection in Extensive-Form Games with Commitment.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018

Computing the Strategy to Commit to in Polymatrix Games.
Proceedings of the Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018

2017
Bilevel Programming Approaches to the Computation of Optimistic and Pessimistic Single-Leader-Multi-Follower Equilibria.
Proceedings of the 16th International Symposium on Experimental Algorithms, 2017

On the Complexity of Nash Equilibrium Reoptimization.
Proceedings of the Thirty-Third Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, 2017

Pessimistic Leader-Follower Equilibria with Multiple Followers.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017


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