Akaki Mamageishvili

CoRR, 2024

Searcher Competition in Block Building.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2024

Searcher Competition in Block Building.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Christoph Schlegel

Benny Sudakov

Proceedings of the 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies, 2024

BoLD: Fast and Cheap Dispute Resolution.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies, 2024

2023

Large elections and interim turnout.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., January, 2023

Crowdsearch.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Fikri Pitsuwan

CoRR, 2023

Shared Sequencing and Latency Competition as a Noisy Contest.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2023

EIP-4844 Economics and Rollup Strategies.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Davide Crapis

CoRR, 2023

Buying Time: Latency Racing vs. Bidding in Fair Transaction Ordering.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Mahimna Kelkar

CoRR, 2023

Decentralized Attack Search and the Design of Bug Bounty Schemes.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Fikri Pitsuwan

CoRR, 2023

Axioms for Constant Function Market Makers.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Mateusz Kwasnicki

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

Incentive Schemes for Rollup Validators.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Mathematical Research for Blockchain Economy: 4th International Conference MARBLE 2023, 2023

Efficient Rollup Batch Posting Strategy on Base Layer.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2023 International Workshops, 2023

Buying Time: Latency Racing vs. Bidding for Transaction Ordering.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Mahimna Kelkar

Proceedings of the 5th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies, 2023

2022

Lemons and peaches: Multi-stage buying mechanisms with a Devil's Menu.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Math. Soc. Sci., 2022

Appointed learning for the common good: Optimal committee size and monetary transfers.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., 2022

Efficient L2 Batch Posting Strategy on L1.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2022

Axioms for Constant Function AMMs.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2022

Staking Pools on Blockchains.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2022

On the Impact of Vote Delegation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Mathematical Research for Blockchain Economy, 2022

On-Chain Auctions with Deposits.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2022 International Workshops, 2022

2021

The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Econ. Theory, 2021

Vote Delegation Favors Minority.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2021

Vote Delegation and Misbehavior.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 14th International Symposium, 2021

2020

Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., 2020

Mechanism Design and Blockchains.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2020

How Many Citizens Have Already Voted? The Effect of (Interim) Turnout Rate Polls in Elections.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 16th International Conference, 2020

Optimal Smart Contracts with Costly Verification.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency, 2020

Vote Delegation and Malicious Parties.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency, 2020

FileBounty: Fair Data Exchange.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops, 2020

2019

Sophisticated Attacks on Decoy Ballots: A Devil's Menu.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 15th International Conference, 2019

2018

Improved bounds on equilibria solutions in the network design game.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Simone Montemezzani

Int. J. Game Theory, 2018

No truthful mechanism can be better than <i>n</i> approximate for two natural problems.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Stefano Leucci

Paolo Penna

Games Econ. Behav., 2018

2017

Inefficiency Measures in Network Formation and Load Balancing Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

PhD thesis, 2017

No truthful mechanism can be better than n approximate for two natural problems.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Stefano Leucci

Paolo Penna

CoRR, 2017

Sophisticated Attacks on Decoy Ballots: The Devil's Menu and the Market for Lemons.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2017

Election Security and Economics: It's All About Eve.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Electronic Voting - Second International Joint Conference, 2017

2016

Tighter bounds on the inefficiency ratio of stable equilibria in load balancing games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Paolo Penna

Oper. Res. Lett., 2016

Sequential Solutions in Machine Scheduling Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2016

2015

Tree Nash Equilibria in the Network Creation Game.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Dominik Müller

Internet Math., 2015

Multicast Network Design Game on a Ring.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Combinatorial Optimization and Applications, 2015

2014

An $H_{n/2}$ Upper Bound on the Price of Stability of Undirected Network Design Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Simone Montemezzani

CoRR, 2014

An H n/2 Upper Bound on the Price of Stability of Undirected Network Design Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]