Afshin Nikzad

Orcid: 0000-0002-8085-705X

According to our database1, Afshin Nikzad authored at least 22 papers between 2010 and 2024.

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Bibliography

2024
Equity and Efficiency in Dynamic Matching: Extreme Waitlist Policies.
Manag. Sci., 2024

Multi-Criteria Allocation Mechanisms: Constraints and Comparative Statics.
Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2024

2023
Expressiveness, Cost, and Collectivism: How the Design of Preference Languages Shapes Participation in Algorithmic Decision-Making.
Proceedings of the 2023 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, 2023

2022
Constrained Majorization: Applications in Mechanism Design.
Proceedings of the EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Boulder, CO, USA, July 11, 2022

2021
Persuading a pessimist: Simplicity and robustness.
Games Econ. Behav., 2021

Optimal Dynamic Allocation: Simplicity through Information Design.
Proceedings of the EC '21: The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021

2020
What matters in school choice tie-breaking? How competition guides design.
J. Econ. Theory, 2020

2019
Assigning more students to their top choices: A comparison of tie-breaking rules.
Games Econ. Behav., 2019

2018
Budget Feasible Procurement Auctions.
Oper. Res., 2018

2017
Approximation Algorithms for Computing Maximin Share Allocations.
ACM Trans. Algorithms, 2017

2016
What Matters in School Choice Tie-breakings?: How Competition Guides Design.
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016

Reservation Exchange Markets for Internet Advertising.
Proceedings of the 43rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, 2016

2015
Assigning More Students to their Top Choices: A Tiebreaking Rule Comparison.
Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2015

2014
Mechanisms Design for Crowdsourcing: An Optimal 1-1/e Approximate Budget-Feasible Mechanism for Large Markets.
CoRR, 2014

Allocating tasks to workers with matching constraints: truthful mechanisms for crowdsourcing markets.
Proceedings of the 23rd International World Wide Web Conference, 2014

Sending Secrets Swiftly: Approximation Algorithms for Generalized Multicast Problems.
Proceedings of the Automata, Languages, and Programming - 41st International Colloquium, 2014

Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing Markets with Heterogeneous Tasks.
Proceedings of the Seconf AAAI Conference on Human Computation and Crowdsourcing, 2014

Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing: An Optimal 1-1/e Competitive Budget-Feasible Mechanism for Large Markets.
Proceedings of the 55th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2014

Deliver or hold: Approximation Algorithms for the Periodic Inventory Routing Problem.
Proceedings of the Approximation, 2014

2012
Optimal online pricing with network externalities.
Inf. Process. Lett., 2012

2011
Colorful Paths in Vertex Coloring of Graphs.
Electron. J. Comb., 2011

2010
Optimal Iterative Pricing over Social Networks (Extended Abstract).
Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics - 6th International Workshop, 2010


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